Stuck on You PTY Ltd. v. Archuleta Innovations, LLC

24 Cited authorities

Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 109 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 193 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 73 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 76 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Recot, Inc. v. Becton
214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 57 times
Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 26 times
Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 73 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A.
685 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 19 times
Declining to "infer from Nestle's failure to provide survey evidence that such evidence would be harmful"
J J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonalds' Corp.
932 F.2d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 45 times 1 Legal Analyses
Ruling that McDonald's has established a family of marks in product names starting with the prefix "Me"
Section 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
15 U.S.C. § 2 Cited 4,504 times 31 Legal Analyses
In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities.
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,615 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Stuck on You PTY Ltd. v. Archuleta Innovations, LLC

24 Cited authorities

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Declining to "infer from Nestle's failure to provide survey evidence that such evidence would be harmful"

Ruling that McDonald's has established a family of marks in product names starting with the prefix "Me"

In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities.

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"