550 U.S. 398 (2007) Cited 1,522 times 180 Legal Analyses
Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
Holding that “flexible” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and reversing the construction of “capable of being noticeably flexed with ease”
Holding that to act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” other than its plain and ordinary meaning
Holding that if, "when read in the context of the entire claim," the preamble "recites limitations of the claim., or . . . is `necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality' to" the claim, the preamble language is properly treated as limiting
Holding that "the claims, specification, and prosecution history of the041 patent demonstrate that the preamble phrase `located at predesignated sites such as consumer stores' is not a limitation of Claim 1," for "the applicant did not rely on this phrase to define its invention nor is the phrase essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body"
Recognizing that the Supreme Court set aside the rigid application of the TSM Test and ensured use of customary knowledge as an ingredient in that equation.
35 U.S.C. § 103 Cited 6,061 times 459 Legal Analyses
Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."