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Split Peak, LLC

14 Cited authorities

  1. In re Cordua Rests., Inc.

    823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 30 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services

  2. Beckwith v. Commr. of Patents

    252 U.S. 538 (1920)   Cited 179 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Defining “composite marks” as those which “contain both registerable and nonregisterable matter”

  3. Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.

    695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 25 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"

  4. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP

    373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 30 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness

  5. In re Nett Designs, Inc.

    236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"

  6. In re N.C. Lottery

    866 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    2016-2558 08-10-2017 IN RE: NORTH CAROLINA LOTTERY, Appellant David E. Bennett, Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David D. Kalish. William Lamarca, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Joseph Matal. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Thomas L. Casagrande, Christina Hieber. Prost, Chief Judge. David E. Bennett , Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David

  7. In re Northland Aluminum Products, Inc.

    777 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 49 times
    Holding "[e]vidence of the public's understanding of term," for purposes of establishing if mark is descriptive, "may be obtained from any competent source, including .^.^. dictionaries"

  8. In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor

  9. Application of Abcor Development Corp.

    588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 36 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

  10. In re Bed & Breakfast Registry

    791 F.2d 157 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 24 times

    Appeal No. 85-2418. May 20, 1986. Mark E. Singer, Winnetka, Ill., for appellant. Nancy C. Slutter, Trademark Examining Atty., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With her on brief, were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Sol. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before SMITH, NEWMAN, and BISSELL, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused registration on the Principal Register of the service

  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,921 times   127 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,615 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"