Simmons Browder Gianaris Angelides and Barnerd, LLC v. The Simmons Firm, ALC

11 Cited authorities

  1. Ritchie v. Simpson

    170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
  2. In re Hutchinson Technology Inc.

    852 F.2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 19 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the issue presented by a composite mark consisting of personal names is "what the purchasing public would think when confronted with the mark as a whole"
  3. Otto Roth Co. v. Universal Foods Corp.

    640 F.2d 1317 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 20 times
    Recognizing importance of "free use of the language" in commercial speech context
  4. Levi Strauss Co. v. Genesco, Inc.

    742 F.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 13 times
    In Levi Strauss Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1401, 222 U.S.P.Q. 939 (Fed. Cir. 1984), we affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's refusal to register a mark for a shoe tab. Noting the significant prior use of such tabs by other companies, we held that "Levi's use of a tab on shoes has been neither first nor exclusive," thus, it failed to show that its mark was distinctive.
  5. In re Etablissements Darty Et Fils

    759 F.2d 15 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 8 times
    In Darty et Fils, however, even though, the primary question was whether "Darty" was primarily merely a surname, the Board had correctly held that the Opposers’ "provides no support for their contention."
  6. Golomb v. Wadsworth

    592 F.2d 1184 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 4 times

    Appeal No. 78-582. March 8, 1979. Rehearing Denied April 19, 1979. Robert D. Hornbaker, Lindenberg, Freilich, Hornbaker, Wasserman, Rosen Fernandez, Los Angeles, Cal., attorneys of record, for appellant. George H. Mortimer, New York City, attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  7. Quaker St. Oil Ref. Corp. v. Quaker Oil

    453 F.2d 1296 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 8 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8616. January 20, 1972. Edward G. Fenwick, Jr., Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C., attorneys of record, for appellant. Frank B. Powell, Cohn Powell, St. Louis, Mo., attorneys of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges, and RAO, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, reported in full at

  8. Application of Standard Elektrik

    371 F.2d 870 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7709. February 9, 1967. C. Cornell Remsen, Jr., New York City (Donald J. Goodell, New York City, of counsel), for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (George C. Roeming, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. Appellant appeals from the decision of the Trademark

  9. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   272 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  10. Section 1064 - Cancellation of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1064   Cited 888 times   48 Legal Analyses
    Allowing a petition to cancel a certification mark if the registered owner "discriminately refuses to certify" qualifying goods or services
  11. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"