375 U.S. 405 (1964) Cited 213 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Act โprohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect.โ
In Joy Silk the Court held that when an employer could have no doubt as to the majority status or when an employer refuses recognition of a union "due to a desire to gain time and to take action to dissipate the union's majority, the refusal is no longer justifiable and constitutes a violation of the duty to bargain set forth in section 8(a)(5) of the Act".
In Bourne, we held that interrogation which does not contain express threats is not an unfair labor practice unless certain "fairly severe standards" are met showing that the very fact of interrogation was coercive.
In Texas Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 336 F.2d 128 (5 Cir. 1964), the court held that charges filed by the Union that alleged generally that the company had "engaged in * * * unfair labor practices within the meaning of" Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and then alleged specifically various acts of coercion against a named employee was sufficient to include unfair labor practices by the company against other employees which were not mentioned in the charges.
In NLRB v. River Togs, Inc. (2d Cir. July 27, 1967) 382 F.2d 198, however, we recognized some of the limitations of the authorization card procedure, calling for scrutiny of the manner of execution of the cards.
In NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 76-77 (2 Cir. 1965), this court held that various promises of benefits and an invitation to deal directly with the company violated ยง 8(a)(1).
In Irving Air Chute Co. v. N.L.R.B., 2 Cir., 350 F.2d 176, 182, the Court in allowing enforcement of the Board's order cited many cases for the proposition, "`It is for the Board not the courts to determine how the effect of prior unfair labor practices may be expunged'."