Ship Smart, Inc. v. Clifford Holdings, Inc.

14 Cited authorities

  1. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.

    477 U.S. 242 (1986)   Cited 243,214 times   39 Legal Analyses
    Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"
  2. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 191 times   33 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  3. World Carpets v. Dick Littrell's New Wld. Car

    438 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1971)   Cited 168 times
    Holding that "very little proof of actual confusion would be necessary to prove likelihood of confusion"
  4. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice

    710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them
  5. Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.

    308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 47 times
    Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
  6. Opryland USA v. Great American Music Show

    970 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.
  7. West Florida Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Restaurants

    31 F.3d 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 21 times
    Recognizing that separate corporate, business and personal entities that operate as a single entity in the eyes of the consuming public may be treated as such for trademark purposes
  8. Lloyd's Food Products, Inc. v. Eli's, Inc.

    987 F.2d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion
  9. Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.

    951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”
  10. Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc.

    961 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
  11. Rule 56 - Summary Judgment

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56   Cited 339,042 times   162 Legal Analyses
    Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
  12. Rule 6 - Computing and Extending Time; Time for Motion Papers

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 6   Cited 52,439 times   24 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "if the last day [of a period] is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday."