550 U.S. 398 (2007) Cited 1,577 times 189 Legal Analyses
Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
Holding that claim terms should be given plain and ordinary meaning unless patentee acts as own lexicographer or disavows claim scope in specification or prosecution history
Holding that although a party cannot change the scope of its claim construction on appeal, it is not precluded “from proffering additional or new supporting arguments, based on evidence of record, for its claim construction”
Holding a patent claim construction that reads limitations out of a claim is "contrary to the principle that claim language should not [be] treated as meaningless"
Holding that a party "waived its right to assert a construction other than 'matches or equals' for the term 'meet'" because it agreed to that construction in its briefs
Holding that the claim language "means formed on the . . . sidewall portions including a plurality of spaced apart . . . members protruding from the . . . sidewall portions and forming load lock . . ." did not invoke § 112, ¶ 6: "The claim language does not link the term means to a function . . . Instead, the claim recites structure. . . . Without a `means' sufficiently connected to a recited function, the presumption in use of the word `means' does not operate."
Holding that an expert's statement "in conclusory fashion" that two methods were not "significantly different" is the type of "cursory conclusion" that "will not withstand summary judgment."
35 U.S.C. § 103 Cited 6,174 times 493 Legal Analyses
Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."