Roll-A-Cover, LLC v. James D. Cohen

14 Cited authorities

In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 72 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 72 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc.
105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) Cited 33 times
Holding that DELTA is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFÉ where the disclaimed word CAFÉ is descriptive of applicant's restaurant services
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) Cited 57 times
Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America
970 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 38 times
Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"
In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 11 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.
951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 14 times
Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”
Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank
811 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 13 times
Affirming likelihood of confusion
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Roll-A-Cover, LLC v. James D. Cohen

14 Cited authorities

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that DELTA is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFÉ where the disclaimed word CAFÉ is descriptive of applicant's restaurant services

Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"

Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion

Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

Affirming likelihood of confusion

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"