Richard D. Welch

12 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,711 times   164 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"
  2. Liebel-Flarsheim Company v. Medrad, Inc.

    358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 1,299 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claim terms are given the full breadth of their ordinary meaning unless a clear disavowal of scope is stated in the specification
  3. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 87 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  4. Saunders Gr. v. Comfortrac

    492 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 65 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claim scope is not limited to the disclosed embodiments "unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to [do so]"
  5. In re Montgomery

    677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 37 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "[c]laim construction is a question of law"
  6. In re Bode

    550 F.2d 656 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-644. February 24, 1977. Jim Zegeer, Washington, D.C., Donald Keith Wedding, Toledo, Ohio, attys. of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, R.V. Lupo, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals (board) affirming

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,054 times   445 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,937 times   943 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)