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R. R. Donnelley and Sons Co.

60 N.L.R.B. 635 (N.L.R.B. 1945)
R. R. Donnelley and Sons Co.

6 Cited authorities

  1. Labor Board v. Laughlin

    301 U.S. 1 (1937)   Cited 1,499 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the National Labor Relations Act applied only to interstate commerce, and upholding its constitutionality on that basis

  2. J.I. Case Co. v. Labor Board

    321 U.S. 332 (1944)   Cited 457 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the result of a collective bargaining agreement is not "a contract of employment except in rare cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no obligation to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from it alone"

  3. Labor Board v. Link-Belt Co.

    311 U.S. 584 (1941)   Cited 338 times
    Finding a violation of the Act when a supervisor mistakenly believed an employee was involved with the union and discharged him "because of his alleged union activities"

  4. I.A. of M. v. Labor Board

    311 U.S. 72 (1940)   Cited 317 times
    In International Ass'n of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 1940, 311 U.S. 72, 61 S.Ct. 83, 85 L. Ed. 50, there had been a long history of management favoritism to the established and hostility to the aspiring union; and in Franks Bros. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 1944, 321 U.S. 702, 703, 64 S.Ct. 817, 818, 88 L.Ed. 1020, the employer had "conducted an aggressive campaign against the Union, even to the extent of threatening to close its factory if the union won the election."

  5. Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board

    311 U.S. 7 (1940)   Cited 231 times   3 Legal Analyses
    In Republic Steel, supra, the Court refused to enforce an order requiring the employer to pay the full amount of back pay to an employee who had been paid to work for the Work Projects Administration in the meantime.

  6. Labor Board v. Virginia Power Co.

    314 U.S. 469 (1941)   Cited 169 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In NLRB v. Virginia Electric Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477, 62 S.Ct. 344, 348, 86 L.Ed. 348 (1941), the Supreme court concluded that the Wagner Act could not be interpreted to prohibit an employer from exercising his First Amendment right to express his views to employees on the merits of unionization, provided the expression was neither coercive nor part of a coercive course of conduct.