Poly-Gel L.L.C. v. Gelli Arts LLC

14 Cited authorities

  1. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 74 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  2. In re Bayer

    488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 40 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
  3. Cold War Museum v. Cold War Air Museum

    586 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that registration per 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) creates a rebuttable presumption of validity, rebuttal of which requires a preponderance of the evidence showing
  4. Cerveceria Centroamericana v. Cerveceria

    892 F.2d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 50 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that in the absence of evidence of intent to resume use during the period of non-use, the TTAB "may conclude the registrant has . . . failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment," even when there is evidence of intent to resume after the period of nonuse
  5. Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.

    753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 14 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act
  6. In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor

  7. Application of Abcor Development Corp.

    588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 36 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
  8. In re Gyulay

    820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
  9. Massey Junior Col. v. Fas. Inst. of Tech

    492 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 23 times
    Finding that conflicting marks need to be analyzed in their entirety even when sharing a prominent feature
  10. Rule 56 - Summary Judgment

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56   Cited 336,166 times   161 Legal Analyses
    Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,882 times   126 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,599 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  13. Section 1057 - Certificates of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1057   Cited 1,043 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
  14. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"