550 U.S. 398 (2007) Cited 1,574 times 189 Legal Analyses
Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"
Holding that to act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” other than its plain and ordinary meaning
Holding that if, "when read in the context of the entire claim," the preamble "recites limitations of the claim., or . . . is `necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality' to" the claim, the preamble language is properly treated as limiting
Holding that the presumption established by claim differentiation was rebutted because the written description “consistently” referred to the claim term in a specific manner and arguments made during prosecution amounted to a clear and unambiguous disclaimer of claim scope
Holding that a chemical formulation that the applicants could have claimed given that it appeared in their priority application, but chose not to, falls outside the scope, literal or equivalent, of the claim
Holding that it is improper to read a limitation "into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim."
35 U.S.C. § 103 Cited 6,172 times 492 Legal Analyses
Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."