Park Hotel Management Pte Ltd. v. Park Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

32 Cited authorities

Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 109 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 194 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 73 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 76 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.
424 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 62 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding that attorney argument did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC
794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 29 times 2 Legal Analyses
Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 26 times
Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 74 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group
637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"
Rule 801 - Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay
Fed. R. Evid. 801 Cited 19,856 times 77 Legal Analyses
Holding that such a statement must merely be made by the party and offered against that party
Rule 701 - Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
Fed. R. Evid. 701 Cited 6,032 times 28 Legal Analyses
Limiting lay testimony to "one that is rationally based on the witness's perception" (cleaned up)
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,922 times 127 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Rule 602 - Need for Personal Knowledge
Fed. R. Evid. 602 Cited 3,690 times 13 Legal Analyses
Stating that " witness may testify only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter"
Section 2.116 - Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
37 C.F.R. § 2.116 Cited 50 times
Making the federal rules of civil procedure generally applicable in TTAB proceedings
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Park Hotel Management Pte Ltd. v. Park Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

32 Cited authorities

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Finding that attorney argument did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment

Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"

Holding that such a statement must merely be made by the party and offered against that party

Limiting lay testimony to "one that is rationally based on the witness's perception" (cleaned up)

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Stating that " witness may testify only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter"

Making the federal rules of civil procedure generally applicable in TTAB proceedings

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"