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Papercraft Corp.

212 N.L.R.B. 240 (N.L.R.B. 1974)
Papercraft Corp.

5 Cited authorities

  1. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Strong

    393 U.S. 357 (1969)   Cited 115 times
    Explaining that, though broad, the NLRA's grant of remedial power "does not authorize punitive measures"

  2. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. C & C Plywood Corp.

    385 U.S. 421 (1967)   Cited 117 times
    Holding that the NLRB has the authority to interpret CBAs in the first instance where its interpretation is for the purpose of “enforc[ing] a statutory right which Congress considered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with the process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employment”

  3. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. N.L.R.B

    473 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1973)   Cited 24 times

    No. 72-1425. October 24, 1972. Rehearing Denied February 6, 1973. Messrs. Glen M. Bendixsen and Charles N. Steele, Washington, D.C., were on the motion for summary reversal for appellants. Messrs. Lawrence M. Cohen, Jeffrey S. Goldman, Chicago, Ill., Alan Raywid, Washington, D.C., and Gerard C. Smetana, Chicago Ill., were on the opposition to appellants' motion for summary reversal. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Before LEVENTHAL and WILKEY, Circuit Judges

  4. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.

    346 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1972)   Cited 2 times

    Civ. A. No. 1571-71. August 10, 1972. Lederer, Fox Grove, Chicago, Cole, Zylstra Raywid, Washington, D.C., and Gerard C. Smetana, Chicago, for plaintiff. Glenn M. Bendixen, Chief Sp. Litigation, N.L.R.B., Washington, D.C., for defendants. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CORCORAN, District Judge. This cause is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Sears, Roebuck and Co. (hereinafter Sears) is a "charging party" before the National Labor Relations Board, (Board Case No. 19-CB-1673)

  5. Section 552 - Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings

    5 U.S.C. § 552   Cited 12,414 times   559 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Court's entering of a “Stipulation and Order” approving the parties' terms of dismissal did not amount to a “court-ordered consent decree” that would render the plaintiff the prevailing party