Holding that where statute's meaning is obvious, courts and Board must defer to Congress's unambiguous intent, but where ambiguity exists, courts must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute
Explaining that the deferential standard of review is appropriate because the "[the ALJ] ... sees the witnesses and hears them testify, while the Board and the reviewing court look only at cold records"
375 U.S. 405 (1964) Cited 213 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Act “prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect.”
414 U.S. 270 (1973) Cited 123 times 1 Legal Analyses
Noting that although an employee may not be "legally bound to vote for the union and has not promised to do so in any formal sense" some "would feel obliged " to cast a union vote after having signed a union recognition slip
In Magnavox, the Board changed its bifurcated rule and adopted the Eighth Circuit's view that the union had no power to waive employee distribution rights on behalf of either itself or another union.
In Best Products we stated that "while the court is not bound by the Board's view on retroactive application, it should defer to those views absent manifest injustice."
Holding that LPNs' authority to assign work to aides did not involve independent judgement where authority to assign work to aides simply involved following management's policy and procedure