On September 24, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's August 28, 2009, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final decision. BACKGROUND During the relevant time, Complainant, a disabled Veteran with back and neck injuries, worked as a WS-4 Materials Handler Supervisor at the Federal Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland. His duties included supervising inmates in the prison warehouse while they performed various jobs, supervising the prison laundry, and working in the commissary selling products to inmates. These various responsibilities were performed on a rotational basis. In approximately 2001, Complainant suffered an on-the-job injury which resulted in knee surgery. Years later,1 Complainant requested that he no longer work in the commissary as an accommodation for his knees. Instead, Complainant was removed from all of his Materials Handler Supervisor duties and temporarily reassigned to monitor inmate phone calls, thereby allowing him to avoid prolonged standing. Additionally, the Agency removed Complainant's collateral duty Firearms Instructor responsibilities. Believing that the denial of his requested accommodation, reassignment to telephone monitoring, and removal of Firearms Instructor duties were discriminatory, Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor. Informal efforts to resolve Complainant's concerns were unsuccessful. Subsequently, on October 29, 2007, Complainant filed a formal complaint based on disability and reprisal. The Agency framed the claims as follows: Believing that the denial of his requested accommodation, reassignment to telephone monitoring, and removal of Firearms Instructor duties were discriminatory, Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor. Informal efforts to resolve Complainant's concerns were unsuccessful. Subsequently, on October 29, 2007, Complainant filed a formal complaint based on disability and reprisal. The Agency framed the claims as follows: (1) On September 10, 2007, Complainant's request for a reasonable accommodation was denied; (2) On September 24, 2007, he was reassigned from the warehouse to telephone monitoring; (3) Complainant was removed as a firearms instructor; (4) Complainant's medical information was shared with staff other than the Warden; and (5) Complainant's quarterly performance evaluation was lowered from "outstanding" to "exceeds." At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with Complainant's request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. First, the Agency maintained that Complainant was provided an effective reasonable accommodation. Assuming that Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability, the Agency explained that upon receiving Complainant's request it sought medical documentation. While Complainant contends that the Agency failed to act for a year and then denied his request on September 10, 2007, the Agency stated that Complainant did not submit documentation until August 1, 2007. Moreover, during that period, his hours in the commissary were reduced. Upon receiving the medical documents, stated the Agency, Complainant was removed from his Materials Handler Supervisor duties and temporarily reassigned to monitor phone calls. The Agency noted that Complainant himself admitted that this assignment alleviated his medical condition. Therefore, according to the Agency, Complainant was not denied an accommodation (claim (1)), as the reassignment to telephone monitoring (claim (2)) was an effective accommodation. With respect to the Firearms Instructor duties (claim(3)), the Agency concluded that there is "no evidence that removing [C]omplainant from serving as firearms instructor was anything more than a reasonably prudent action, particularly given the lack of medical information about [C]omplainant's impairment."The only statement cited in the Agency's decision, with respect to claim (3), was the management official's comment that he suggested removal of the collateral duty because Complainant was "complaining so much about his back and his legs and everything else."According to the official, he suggested the removal of Complainant's instructor duties out of "a safety concern for him", as he did not want Complainant to be injured further. As to the alleged improper dissemination of Complainant's medical records (claim (4)), the Agency reasoned that the documents were only accessed by those individuals involved with Complainant's reasonable accommodation request. While the Complainant believed that only the Warden should have reviewed the documents, the Agency found it necessary for the Associate Warden, the Employee Services Manager, Safety Manager, and Complainant's supervisor to also have access. Further, the Agency found no evidence that those involved with processing and implementing Complainant's accommodation request improperly shared the records. Lastly, while Complainant alleged that his reduced quarterly performance rating was retaliatory, the Agency found the claim to be unsupported by the record. As an initial matter, the Agency noted that Complainant did not suffer any tangible harm, as an "exceeds" rating is still "a very good rating" and did not cause a loss of pay or other benefit. Next, the Agency stated that there is "no evidence that management's actions would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from engaged in protected EEO activity" and it did not prevent Complainant from doing so. According to the Agency, there is no evidence that the "exceeds" rating was motivated by Complainant's prior EEO activity. Complainant filed the instant appeal. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant disputes various points in the Agency's decision. For example, he contends that he was sent for an exam with an Agency doctor regarding his back and neck, but his accommodation request concerned his knees. The Agency's assertion that his medical documents, showing that he was a disabled veteran, were outdated is also false because he "hasn't healed overnight." Complainant argues that the Agency failed to engage in the interactive process. He reiterates that his request for an accommodation was not acted upon until a year later, when he began the EEO complaint process. Regarding his claims of reprisal, Complainant reiterates his belief that the removal of his Firearms Instructor position was motivated by his EEO activity. If it was done as an accommodation, Complainant asks why it was not done when he first requested to be relieved from commissary duty. If the duties were taken to prevent Complainant from harming himself, Complainant wonders why management did not ask the Lead Firearms Instructor if there was a danger of such harm. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Standard of Review As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R, � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law"). Disability Reasonable Accommodation The Commission notes that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against qualified disabled individuals. See29 C.F.R. � 1630. In order to establish that Complainant was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) he is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g); (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability pursuant to 29 C.F. R. � 1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002). Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless the Agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1630.2(c) and (p). For the purposes of analysis only, we shall assume that Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability and is therefore entitled to reasonable accommodation. The Commission finds, however, that Complainant has not established that the Agency failed to reasonably accommodate him. Complainant requested that he not be required to work in the commissary as a reasonable accommodation. The Agency states that it participated in the interactive process by seeking medical documentation from him. While the Agency may have been aware of Complainant's disabled Veteran status, and associated back and neck injuries, the instant request concerned his knees. Moreover, Complainant had been performing the commissary duties for years following his knee surgery. Therefore, we find that it was appropriate for the Agency to seek relevant documentation. While Complainant argues that the Agency delayed processing his request, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, his assertion is not supported by the record. The Agency contends that Complainant himself caused the delay by waiting to provide the requested medical documents. As for the alleged denial of an accommodation, the Commission finds that Complainant was accommodated. We note that the Rehabilitation Act does not require than an agency offer an individual the accommodation of his choice, but simply an effective accommodation. Here, although Complainant sought to be permanently excused from working in the commissary,2 he was temporarily transferred to telephone monitoring. However, Complainant's own testimony reflects that the accommodation has been effective. He attested that he is no longer standing all the time, and is able to get up and walk when he needs to.3 Therefore, we do not find Complainant was discriminated against in claims (1) and (2). Medical Disclosure Complainant contends that the Warden improperly disclosed his medical information to other staff members. The Commission's regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act provide for the confidentiality of medical records. Specifically, 29 C.F.R, � 1630.14(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: "Information obtained . . . regarding the medical condition or history of any employee shall ... be treated as a confidential medical record, except that: (i) [s]upervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations."By its terms, this requirement applies to confidential medical information obtained from "any employee," and is not limited to individuals with disabilities. See Hampton v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00132 (April 13, 2000).see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans With Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities ("Enforcement Guidance - ADA"), No. 915.002 (March 25, 1997) at question 15; EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Disability Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("Enforcement Guidance - Disability Related Inquiries"), No. 915.002 (July 27, 2000) at General Principles; ADA Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations ("Enforcement Guidance - Pre-employment"), No. 915.002 (October 10, 1995). Since the Warden was the only one who could make a decision about granting an accommodation, Complainant reasoned that she should have been the only individual to see his medical information. According to Complainant, his medical records were shared with the Associate Warden, the Employee Services Manager, the Employee Services Manager, and his supervisor. The Commission finds that medical information was only shared with those involved with processing and implementing Complainant's request for a reasonable accommodation. The Warden attested that the Associate Warden participates in the decision-making process. The Employee Services Manager works to maintain employee records, and would have had access to the records for that reason. Complainant's direct supervisor (the Trust Fund Supervisor), was informed in order to implement the accommodation.4 Consequently, we do not find that Complainant has established that his medical information was improperly shared as alleged in claim (4). Reprisal Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), and Coffman v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000). In claim (3), Complainant alleged that he was discriminatorily removed from his Firearms Instructor position. The position was collateral duty, and comprised approximately one week a year of Complainant's time. According to Complainant, "there's nothing I couldn't do out at the range."He explained that instruction takes only fifteen minutes, and he can sit, walk and move as needed. Complainant believes that his supervisor removed him from the position in retaliation for his EEO activity. The Commission agrees. When asked about the decision to remove the Firearms Instructor responsibilities, Complainant's supervisor attested "Yeah, I was involved in that because due to the fact that he was complaining so much about his back and his legs and everything else. . . .I was thinking of it more as a safety concern for him. You know, I mean, if he can't bend or lift or, you know do anything out in the warehouse5 or the commissary, it's the same thing out on the range."The supervisor reasoned that the physical activity on the range was not any different than his other duties, "same thing as being on his feet for many, many hours. You know, that as I was aware of. I mean, if he was complaining about his back, his legs, and stuff like that, that has a wear and tear too, from what I understand," Yet, when the investigator asked whether the Firearms Instructor position could be performed from a seated or resting position, the supervisor replied "I really don't know about that because I'm not out on the range all day long." The supervisor's own testimony reflects that Complainant's instructor duties were removed because he was complaining. While the supervisor professed that he was motivated by concern of further harm to Complainant's impairments, he himself admitted that he did not know the physical requirements of the role. Consequently, we find that the supervisor was motivated by discriminatory animus towards Complainant's efforts to obtain a reasonable accommodation. Similarly, the Commission finds that Complainant's lowered evaluation was retaliatory. First, we note the blaring absence in the Agency's analysis of a legitimate reason for the reduction from "outstanding" to "exceeds." Instead, the Agency attempts to persuade the Commission that Complainant was not harmed by the evaluation because an "exceeds" rating "by the way, is a very good rating" and did not result in a loss of pay. The lower quarterly evaluation was in writing, retained in his files, and considered in determining the yearly evaluation. Complainant asserts that it was motivated by retaliation. See Little v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0120100488 (April 15, 2011) (negative feedback during year-end performance discussion found to state a claim because the review was placed in personnel folder and used for lowering end-of-year appraisal). Therefore, we find that event in claim (5) clearly rendered him an "aggrieved" employee. As acknowledged by the Agency, the Commission has stated that adverse actions need not qualify as "ultimate employment actions" or materially affect the terms and conditions of employment to constitute retaliation. Lindsey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05980410 (Nov. 4, 1999) (citing EEOC Compliance Manual. No. 915.003 (May 20, 1998)). Instead, the statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is based upon a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity. Id. The Commission finds that the lowered evaluation constitutes an adverse treatment that may be reasonably likely to deter Complainant or others from engaged in protected activity. See Little v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0120100488 (April 15, 2011) (negative comments were found likely to deter complainant or a reasonable employee from engaging in EEO activity).