Oakley, Inc. v. JMM Lee Properties, LLC

32 Cited authorities

  1. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC

    668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 108 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
  2. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  3. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 72 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
  4. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 74 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  5. Recot, Inc. v. Becton

    214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
  6. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC

    794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 28 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
  7. Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.

    308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 45 times
    Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
  8. Ritchie v. Simpson

    170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
  9. In re I.Am.Symbolic, LLC

    866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 17 times
    Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion
  10. Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries

    963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
  11. Section 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden

    15 U.S.C. § 1125   Cited 15,715 times   326 Legal Analyses
    Holding "the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional"
  12. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,886 times   126 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
  13. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,600 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  14. Section 1057 - Certificates of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1057   Cited 1,044 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
  15. Section 2.120 - Discovery

    37 C.F.R. § 2.120   Cited 23 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that the TTAB "in its discretion, may refuse to consider the additional written disclosures or responses"
  16. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"