No Fear, Inc. v. Wallace Martin Eggert

14 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 237,216 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd.
83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996) Cited 235 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that district court could balance potential benefits of Rule 56(f) discovery against the "costs, burdens, and delays that the proposed discovery entailed"
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries
963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 49 times
Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Products
866 F.2d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1989) Cited 45 times
Finding that as a preliminary to comparing the marks in their entireties it is not improper to give less weight to the generic "pecan" part of the marks in finding no likely confusion in: PECAN SANDIES pecan cookies vs. PECAN SHORTEES pecan cookies
Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc.
739 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1984) Cited 49 times
Holding that the nonmovant "must set out, usually in an affidavit by one with knowledge of specific facts, what specific evidence could be offered at trial."
Copelands' Enterprises, Inc. v. CNV, Inc.
945 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 25 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that PTO may deny registration if applicant has deceived consumers or competitors
Opryland USA v. Great American Music Show
970 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 23 times
In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.
Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.
951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 14 times
Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”
Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc.
961 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 12 times
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
Rule 56 - Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Cited 330,185 times 158 Legal Analyses
Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,805 times 123 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,584 times 270 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

No Fear, Inc. v. Wallace Martin Eggert

14 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that district court could balance potential benefits of Rule 56(f) discovery against the "costs, burdens, and delays that the proposed discovery entailed"

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks

Finding that as a preliminary to comparing the marks in their entireties it is not improper to give less weight to the generic "pecan" part of the marks in finding no likely confusion in: PECAN SANDIES pecan cookies vs. PECAN SHORTEES pecan cookies

Holding that the nonmovant "must set out, usually in an affidavit by one with knowledge of specific facts, what specific evidence could be offered at trial."

Holding that PTO may deny registration if applicant has deceived consumers or competitors

In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.

Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"

Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"