MGF Financial, Inc.

12 Cited authorities

Beckwith v. Commr. of Patents
252 U.S. 538 (1920) Cited 175 times 1 Legal Analyses
Defining “composite marks” as those which “contain both registerable and nonregisterable matter”
In re Bayer
488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007) Cited 39 times 2 Legal Analyses
Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
Duopross Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd.
695 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 23 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"
In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP
373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) Cited 30 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness
In re Nett Designs, Inc.
236 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Cited 28 times
Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"
In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States
675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 8 times 2 Legal Analyses
No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor
In re City of Hous.
731 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) Cited 3 times 1 Legal Analyses
Upholding USPTO's refusal to register the Seal of the City of Houston, Texas
In re Boston Beer Co. Ltd. Partnership
198 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the claim "The Best Beer in America" amounted to mere puffery
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,806 times 124 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 271 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

MGF Financial, Inc.

12 Cited authorities

Defining “composite marks” as those which “contain both registerable and nonregisterable matter”

Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark

Holding that, although the Board may "ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark," it "ultimately must consider the mark as a whole and do so in the context of the goods or services at issue"

Holding that courts "may weigh the individual components of the mark" to assess its overall distinctiveness

Finding that prior registrations of marks including the term ULTIMATE "do not conclusively rebut the Board's finding that ULTIMATE is descriptive in the context of this mark"

Upholding USPTO's refusal to register the Seal of the City of Houston, Texas

Holding that the claim "The Best Beer in America" amounted to mere puffery

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"