McDonald's Corporation v. Joel D. Joseph

15 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 194 times   33 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America Online

    229 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 78 times
    Applying Recot in analyzing the similarity of services
  3. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 76 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  4. Recot, Inc. v. Becton

    214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
  5. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.

    293 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 38 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that product marks, ACOUSTIC WAVE and WAVE, were famous in addition to their house mark, BOSE
  6. Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries

    963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
  7. Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina

    670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
  8. Specialty Brands v. Coffee Bean Distributors

    748 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that "[w]hen an opposer's trademark is a strong, famous mark, it can never be of little consequence" in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis
  9. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
  10. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen

    496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 8 times

    Patent Appeal No. 9245. June 6, 1974. J. Timothy Hobbs, Washington, D.C. (Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C.), attorney of record, for appellant. William B. Mason, Arlington, Va. (Mason, Mason Albright, Arlington, Va.), attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 178 USPQ 121 (1973)

  11. Section 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden

    15 U.S.C. § 1125   Cited 15,947 times   330 Legal Analyses
    Holding "the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional"
  12. Section 1 - Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty

    15 U.S.C. § 1   Cited 3,331 times   80 Legal Analyses
    Forbidding every "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States"
  13. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,616 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  14. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"