Marybeth C.,1 Complainant, v. Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Threat Reduction Agency), Agency.

23 Cited authorities

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
548 U.S. 53 (2006) Cited 11,784 times 104 Legal Analyses
Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,667 times 99 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,459 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (1983) Cited 22,383 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding a civil-rights plaintiff can recover attorney's fees for claims that "involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories," even if only one of those claims arises under a fee-shifting statute
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,322 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Carey v. Piphus
435 U.S. 247 (1978) Cited 3,669 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that nominal damages are appropriate when a plaintiff's constitutional rights have been infringed but he cannot show further injury
Texas Teachers Assn. v. Garland School Dist
489 U.S. 782 (1989) Cited 1,903 times
Holding that where party seeks attorney's fees pursuant to fee-shifting statute, "no fee award is permissible until the [party] has crossed the statutory threshold of prevailing party status" (internal quotation marked omitted)
Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.
340 U.S. 474 (1951) Cited 9,712 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that court may not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo "
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,188 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Ash v. Tyson Foods
546 U.S. 454 (2006) Cited 715 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that decisionmaker’s alleged use of term "boy" to refer to African-American employees was evidence of discriminatory animus
Section 2000e - Definitions
42 U.S.C. § 2000e Cited 52,922 times 132 Legal Analyses
Granting EEOC authority to issue procedural regulations to carry out Title VII provisions
Section 621 - Congressional statement of findings and purpose
29 U.S.C. § 621 Cited 17,790 times 22 Legal Analyses
Finding that "older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs"
Section 2000e-16 - Employment by Federal Government
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 Cited 5,067 times 20 Legal Analyses
Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"
Section 791 - Employment of individuals with disabilities
29 U.S.C. § 791 Cited 2,320 times 6 Legal Analyses
Adopting standards for ADA claims under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 12112, which forbids discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability . . ."
Section 1614.407 - Civil action: Title VII, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Rehabilitation Act, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and Pregnant Workers Fairness Act
29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 Cited 763 times 1 Legal Analyses
Authorizing civil actions if no final action is taken within 180 days after a complaint is filed
Section 1614.604 - Filing and computation of time
29 C.F.R. § 1614.604 Cited 140 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing the time limits applicable to the subject regulations "are subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling"
Section 1614.408 - Civil action: Equal Pay Act
29 C.F.R. § 1614.408 Cited 113 times
Requiring that the complainant wait at least 180 days for a decision from the agency before filing a civil action and requiring that such an action be filed within 90 days of a final decision
Section 1614.405 - Decisions on appeals
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405 Cited 83 times 3 Legal Analyses
Providing that " decision [of the EEOC in an administrative appeal] is final . . . unless . . . [e]ither party files a timely request for reconsideration"
Section 1614.503 - Enforcement of final Commission decisions
29 C.F.R. § 1614.503 Cited 64 times
Describing civil action for enforcement of administrative award
Section 1614.409 - Effect of filing a civil action
29 C.F.R. § 1614.409 Cited 51 times
Stating that: "Filing a civil action under § 1614.408 or § 1614.409 shall terminate Commission processing of the appeal"
Section 1614.501 - Remedies and relief
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501 Cited 45 times 3 Legal Analyses
Incorporating § 1920 into the regulations
Section 1614.403 - How to appeal
29 C.F.R. § 1614.403 Cited 34 times
Indicating that failure to file timely appeal requires dismissal by EEOC

Marybeth C.,1 Complainant, v. Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Threat Reduction Agency), Agency.

23 Cited authorities

Holding that a jury could find a reassignment from a position with "an indication of prestige" to one involving less desirable responsibilities "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding a civil-rights plaintiff can recover attorney's fees for claims that "involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories," even if only one of those claims arises under a fee-shifting statute

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that nominal damages are appropriate when a plaintiff's constitutional rights have been infringed but he cannot show further injury

Holding that where party seeks attorney's fees pursuant to fee-shifting statute, "no fee award is permissible until the [party] has crossed the statutory threshold of prevailing party status" (internal quotation marked omitted)

Holding that court may not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo "

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that decisionmaker’s alleged use of term "boy" to refer to African-American employees was evidence of discriminatory animus

Granting EEOC authority to issue procedural regulations to carry out Title VII provisions

Finding that "older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs"

Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"

Adopting standards for ADA claims under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 12112, which forbids discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability . . ."

Authorizing civil actions if no final action is taken within 180 days after a complaint is filed

Providing the time limits applicable to the subject regulations "are subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling"

Requiring that the complainant wait at least 180 days for a decision from the agency before filing a civil action and requiring that such an action be filed within 90 days of a final decision

Providing that " decision [of the EEOC in an administrative appeal] is final . . . unless . . . [e]ither party files a timely request for reconsideration"

Describing civil action for enforcement of administrative award

Stating that: "Filing a civil action under § 1614.408 or § 1614.409 shall terminate Commission processing of the appeal"

Incorporating § 1920 into the regulations

Indicating that failure to file timely appeal requires dismissal by EEOC