Lundin v. Svoboda

17 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 188 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. Ritchie v. Simpson

    170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
  3. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP

    746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 24 times
    Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error
  4. Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina

    670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
  5. Octocom Systems v. Houston Computer Services

    918 F.2d 937 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 28 times

    No. 90-1196. November 2, 1990. Brian M. Dingman, Law Offices of Joseph S. Iandiorio, Waltham, Mass., argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Joseph S. Iandiorio. J. Paul Williamson, Arnold, White Durkee, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before NIES, Chief Judge, ARCHER and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges. NIES, Chief Judge. Octocom Systems, Inc. (OSI), appeals from the final decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark

  6. West Florida Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Restaurants

    31 F.3d 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 21 times
    Recognizing that separate corporate, business and personal entities that operate as a single entity in the eyes of the consuming public may be treated as such for trademark purposes
  7. Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co.

    516 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1975)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that an order deciding liability but leaving damages for later determination was not final
  8. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
  9. University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.

    703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 19 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
  10. Federated Foods v. Fort Howard Paper Co.

    544 F.2d 1098 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 16 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed
  11. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   271 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  12. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"
  13. Section 2.123 - Trial testimony in inter partes cases

    37 C.F.R. § 2.123   Cited 10 times

    (a) (1) The testimony of witnesses in inter partes cases may be submitted in the form of an affidavit or a declaration pursuant to § 2.20 and in conformance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, filed during the proffering party's testimony period, subject to the right of any adverse party to elect to take and bear the expense of oral cross-examination of that witness as provided under paragraph (c) of this section if such witness is within the jurisdiction of the United States, or conduct cross-examination