Lotto Sport Italia S.p.A. v. Ukeje Agu, Jr.

27 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 188 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  2. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 72 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  3. Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.

    308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 45 times
    Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
  4. Ritchie v. Simpson

    170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
  5. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP

    746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 24 times
    Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error
  6. In re Viterra Inc.

    671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 26 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
  7. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group

    637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 27 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"
  8. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.

    293 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 34 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2002), this court held that the marks WAVE and ACOUSTIC WAVE have trademark strength independent of the Bose “house mark,” although the marks appear in the same sales literature.
  9. Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries

    963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
  10. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.

    281 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that a registration for “electronic transmission of data and documents via computer terminals” is “closely related” to a registration “covering facsimile machines, computers, and computer software”
  11. Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification

    15 U.S.C. § 1051   Cited 3,806 times   124 Legal Analyses
    Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,585 times   272 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  13. Section 1057 - Certificates of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1057   Cited 1,027 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
  14. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"
  15. Section 2.121 - Assignment of times for taking testimony and presenting evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.121   Cited 6 times

    (a) The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board will issue a trial order setting a deadline for each party's required pretrial disclosures and assigning to each party its time for taking testimony and presenting evidence ("testimony period"). No testimony shall be taken or evidence presented except during the times assigned, unless by stipulation of the parties approved by the Board, or upon motion granted by the Board, or by order of the Board. The deadlines for pretrial disclosures and the testimony periods