Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. JustGoGirl, LLC

11 Cited authorities

In re Bayer
488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007) Cited 40 times 2 Legal Analyses
Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.
753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 14 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act
In re N.C. Lottery
866 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017) Cited 10 times 1 Legal Analyses
2016-2558 08-10-2017 IN RE: NORTH CAROLINA LOTTERY, Appellant David E. Bennett, Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David D. Kalish. William Lamarca, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Joseph Matal. Also represented by Nathan K. Kelley, Thomas L. Casagrande, Christina Hieber. Prost, Chief Judge. David E. Bennett , Coats & Bennett, PLLC, Cary, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented by David
In re Chamber of Commerce of the United States
675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 8 times 2 Legal Analyses
No. 2011–1330. 2012-04-3 In re The CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES of America. William M. Merone, Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Edward T. Colbert. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Of counsel was Thomas V. Shaw, Associate Solicitor
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,882 times 126 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,599 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1063 - Opposition to registration
15 U.S.C. § 1063 Cited 147 times 19 Legal Analyses
Identifying "dilution by blurring ... under section 1125(c) as a permissible grounds for opposition to a registration"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. JustGoGirl, LLC

11 Cited authorities

Endorsing the use of internet evidence as admissible and competent evidence for evaluating a trademark

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that appellant demonstrated entitlement to a "statutory cause of action" under the Lanham Act

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Identifying "dilution by blurring ... under section 1125(c) as a permissible grounds for opposition to a registration"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"