Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them
Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
Holding that purchaser confusion is the "primary focus" and, in case of goods and services that are sold, "the inquiry generally will turn on whether actual or potential `purchasers' are confused"
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
In Levi Strauss Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1401, 222 U.S.P.Q. 939 (Fed. Cir. 1984), we affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's refusal to register a mark for a shoe tab. Noting the significant prior use of such tabs by other companies, we held that "Levi's use of a tab on shoes has been neither first nor exclusive," thus, it failed to show that its mark was distinctive.
Rejecting a party's argument that the use of the word "HOBO" in several of its marks created a "family", and stating that the party failed to establish, for example, by a survey, that the term HOBO is used in the public in connection with restaurant services to identify the party exclusively.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Cited 94,339 times 92 Legal Analyses
Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint