Kimberly Bailey, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 237,184 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 217,149 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 52,406 times 95 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,283 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 19,997 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
490 U.S. 228 (1989) Cited 4,616 times 161 Legal Analyses
Holding that an employer discriminated on the basis of sex when he "act[ed] on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be"
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston
469 U.S. 111 (1985) Cited 1,859 times
Holding McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable when direct evidence is presented
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,164 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer
Redman v. Warrener
516 F.2d 766 (1st Cir. 1975) Cited 16 times
In Redman v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975), we admonished: "Summary judgment is not to be turned into a trial by affidavit."
Section 2000e-2 - Unlawful employment practices
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 Cited 28,453 times 171 Legal Analyses
Adopting case law prior to June 4, 1989, “with respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice’ ”
Section 2000e-16 - Employment by Federal Government
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 Cited 4,954 times 20 Legal Analyses
Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"
Appendix to Part 1604 - Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Public Law 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
29 C.F.R. § 1604 app to Part 1604 Cited 56 times 1 Legal Analyses
Noting that the bona fide occupational qualification as to sex should be narrowly interpreted

Kimberly Bailey, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that an employer discriminated on the basis of sex when he "act[ed] on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be"

Holding McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable when direct evidence is presented

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

In Redman v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975), we admonished: "Summary judgment is not to be turned into a trial by affidavit."

Adopting case law prior to June 4, 1989, “with respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice’ ”

Adopting provisions of § 2000e-5(f)-(k), including that "[e]ach United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"

Noting that the bona fide occupational qualification as to sex should be narrowly interpreted