Kemin Industries, Inc. v. Naturex

13 Cited authorities

In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 72 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 26 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) Cited 57 times
Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America
970 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 38 times
Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 19 times 2 Legal Analyses
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
Federated Foods v. Fort Howard Paper Co.
544 F.2d 1098 (C.C.P.A. 1976) Cited 16 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed
Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.
648 F.2d 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1981) Cited 9 times
Finding extensive licensing of mark MONOPOLY for real estate game relevant evidence of relatedness of goods
King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen
496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974) Cited 8 times
Patent Appeal No. 9245. June 6, 1974. J. Timothy Hobbs, Washington, D.C. (Mason, Fenwick Lawrence, Washington, D.C.), attorney of record, for appellant. William B. Mason, Arlington, Va. (Mason, Mason Albright, Arlington, Va.), attorney of record, for appellee. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 178 USPQ 121 (1973)
Shunk Manufacturing Co. v. Tarrant Mfg. Co.
318 F.2d 328 (C.C.P.A. 1963) Cited 2 times
Patent Appeal No. 6896. June 10, 1963. Frank M. Slough and J.H. Slough, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant. Luther W. Hawley, New York City, for appellee. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. ALMOND, Judge, Appellant, Shunk Manufacturing Company, filed a trademark application to register a figure, designated as a Scotsman, as a trademark for heavy duty equipment, such as graders and other ground working machines, blades therefor, sand spreaders, etc. The trademark
Rule 34 - Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 Cited 13,267 times 151 Legal Analyses
Finding that the rules related to electronic discovery were "not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system, although such access may be justified in some circumstances."
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 272 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Kemin Industries, Inc. v. Naturex

13 Cited authorities

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

Finding similarity between "CENTURY 21" and "CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA" in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"

In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed

Finding extensive licensing of mark MONOPOLY for real estate game relevant evidence of relatedness of goods

Finding that the rules related to electronic discovery were "not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system, although such access may be justified in some circumstances."

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"