Kellogg Co. v. Paul Ralston

9 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 242,417 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"
Opryland USA v. Great American Music Show
970 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 24 times
In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.
Application of Abcor Development Corp.
588 F.2d 811 (C.C.P.A. 1978) Cited 36 times 2 Legal Analyses
In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc.
961 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Cited 12 times
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
In re Gyulay
820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 14 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive
In re Omaha Nat. Corp.
819 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 4 times 1 Legal Analyses
Appeal No. 86-1567. May 20, 1987. Dennis L. Thomte, Zarley, McKee, Thomte, Voorhees Sease, Omaha, Neb., argued for appellant. Nancy C. Slutter, Asst. Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before NIES, Circuit Judge, COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge, and ARCHER, Circuit Judge. NIES, Circuit Judge. Omaha National Bank appeals
Quaker St. Oil Ref. Corp. v. Quaker Oil
453 F.2d 1296 (C.C.P.A. 1972) Cited 8 times
Deciding the "right to registration" of the trademark "SUPER BLEND" based on the "factual situation" of concurrent use "as of the time when registration is sought"
Rule 56 - Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Cited 337,863 times 161 Legal Analyses
Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,607 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Kellogg Co. v. Paul Ralston

9 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"

In Opryland, Opryland USA opposed the registration of "THE CAROLINA OPRY," arguing that the term was confusingly similar to Opryland's own marks.

In Abcor, the question before the court was whether applicant's alleged mark (GASBADGE) was "merely descriptive" within the meaning of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).

Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"

Stating that the Board did not err in affirming the examiner's prima facie case that the mark was merely descriptive

Deciding the "right to registration" of the trademark "SUPER BLEND" based on the "factual situation" of concurrent use "as of the time when registration is sought"

Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"