477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 223,052 times 42 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Holding that allegation that "Exergen, its agents and/or attorneys . . . knew of the material information and deliberately withheld or misrepresented it" without naming "the specific individual associated with the filing or prosecution of the application" was not sufficiently particular to satisfy the "who" element of an inequitable conduct claim
Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Cited 96,382 times 95 Legal Analyses
Finding that, per N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1024, New York law provides a more forgiving principle for relation back in the context of naming John Doe defendants described with particularity in the complaint