Justin Vineyards & Winery LLC v. Crooked Stave, LLC

23 Cited authorities

  1. Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC

    668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 108 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
  2. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  3. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 74 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  4. Recot, Inc. v. Becton

    214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
  5. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC

    794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 28 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Determining that TTAB failed to adequately account for evidence of "a fair number of third-party uses" of similar marks by discounting the evidence for lack of "specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional efforts surrounding the third-party marks"
  6. Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.

    308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 45 times
    Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
  7. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP

    746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 25 times
    Reviewing the weight given to the similarity-of-the-marks factor for legal error
  8. In re I.Am.Symbolic, LLC

    866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 17 times
    Finding that the similarity of the marks weighed heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion
  9. In re Chippendales USA, Inc.

    622 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 23 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that whether the trade dress was "a common basic shape or design" was "inapplicable" because "there has been no showing that the [trade dress] is common generally"
  10. Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U.

    797 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 17 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Board erred in giving little weight to evidence of registered third-party marks in actual use
  11. Rule 801 - Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay

    Fed. R. Evid. 801   Cited 19,588 times   77 Legal Analyses
    Holding that such a statement must merely be made by the party and offered against that party
  12. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,600 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  13. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"
  14. Section 2.123 - Trial testimony in inter partes cases

    37 C.F.R. § 2.123   Cited 10 times

    (a) (1) The testimony of witnesses in inter partes cases may be submitted in the form of an affidavit or a declaration pursuant to § 2.20 and in conformance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, filed during the proffering party's testimony period, subject to the right of any adverse party to elect to take and bear the expense of oral cross-examination of that witness as provided under paragraph (c) of this section if such witness is within the jurisdiction of the United States, or conduct cross-examination