Julio Gomez, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.

12 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 237,184 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 217,149 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
475 U.S. 574 (1986) Cited 113,539 times 38 Legal Analyses
Holding that, on summary judgment, antitrust plaintiffs "must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed" them
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,187 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 52,406 times 95 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) Cited 12,387 times 23 Legal Analyses
Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,283 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 19,997 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson
477 U.S. 57 (1986) Cited 6,506 times 18 Legal Analyses
Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive
U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens
460 U.S. 711 (1983) Cited 2,406 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination

Julio Gomez, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.

12 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that, on summary judgment, antitrust plaintiffs "must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed" them

Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive

Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination