J.P. Stevens & Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 23, 1979

240 N.L.R.B. 33 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

J. P. STEVENS &r COMPANY 33
J. P. Stevens & Company, Inc. and Amalgamated
Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO.
Case 10-CA 12350
January 23, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND TRUESDALE
On December 22, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Jerry B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed an
exception and a supporting brief; the Charging Party
filed exceptions and a brief, a reply to Respondent's
supplemental brief, and a motion to remand to the
Administrative Law Judge; and Respondent filed
cross-exceptions and a brief, an answering brief to
the exceptions of the General Counsel and the
Charging Party, a supplemental brief, and a reply
brief to the motion to remand.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order as modified herein.
1. After the close of the hearing, but prior to issu-
ing his Decision herein, the Administrative Law
Judge issued a Notice To Show Cause why he should
not take notice, in determining the appropriate rem-
edy, of prior Board and court decisions involving Re-
spondent, to which the Charging Party and General
Counsel had referred in their briefs. Respondent filed
a timely brief (refiled herein as its supplemental
brief). Subsequent to the issuance of the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision, the Charging Party filed a
reply thereto and a motion to reopen the record (re-
filed herein). The Charging Party also filed with the
Board a motion to remand to the Administrative
Law Judge for consideration its motion to reopen.
The Charging Party's motion to remand is hereby
denied as lacking in merit.
2. Although the complaint alleged that on or
about May 10, 1976, Supervisor Dale Stevenson un-
lawfully interrogated and threatened employees, the
Administrative Law Judge failed to consider the tes-
timony of Joe Louis Robinson that Stevenson asked
him during a conversation if he had "mailed in his
union card yet." Stevenson, in denial, recalled no
such conversation. There is an issue of credibility
240 NLRB No. 35
which, however, cannot be determined from the rec-
ord as a whole because the Administrative Law
Judge discredited Stevenson's testimony in one in-
stance and credited it in another. Rather than re-
mand the case for resolutions of credibility, we be-
lieve it would better serve the purposes of the Act to
decide the case now, dismissing this aspect of the
complaint, particularly because the remedy would
not in any event be affected. Accordingly, the com-
plaint insofar as it alleges unlawful threats to and
interrogation of employee Robinson is dismissed.
3. In his exception the General Counsel requests
that the Board's Order be applied to all of Respon-
dent's plants. In view of Respondent's history of seri-
ous and similar violations of the Act ' and its disre-
gard of past Board Orders,2 we find merit in the
General Counsel's exception. Accordingly, we shall
order Respondent to cease and desist from engaging
in unfair labor practices on a corporationwide basis.
See J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 239 NLRB No. 95
(1978).
4. The Charging Party also seeks certain addition-
al remedies. Considering Respondent's long history
of violations of employee rights and its flagrant disre-
gard of Board decisions and court orders, and for the
reasons set forth in J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., supra,
we shall grant the following additional remedies:
mailing of the notice to all employees, reading of the
notice, union access to bulletin boards and lists of
employees' names and addresses, and in-plant access
for the Union. In addition, as Respondent contends
that the alleged violations, if any, were committed by
two minor supervisors, we shall order Respondent to
issue written instructions to all of its supervisors at
the plant involved herein to comply with the notice
of employees marked "Appendix A."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified
and set out in full below, and hereby orders that Re-
spondent, J. P. Stevens & Company, Inc., New
]See J P. Stevens and Co., Inc., 157 NLRB 869 (1966): 163 NLRB 217
(1967): 167 NLRB 258 (1967); 171 NLRB 1202 (1968); 179 NLRB 254
(1969): 181 NLRB 666 (1970); 183 NLRB 25 (1970); 186 NLRB 180 (1970):
190 NLRB 751 (1971) 205 NLRB 1032 (1973): 217 NLRB 513 (1975): and
220 NLRB 270 (1975). See also The Blackhawk Corporation, 177 NLRB 944
(1969). and 183 NLRB 267 (1970).
Respondent has been found in civil contempt by various United States
courts of appeals. See ANLR B v. J P. Stevens & ompnanr Inc.. Gulistan
Division. 538 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976): . R B v. .P. Stevens & Co.. Inc.
563 F 2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977)
J. P. STEVENS & COMPANY
_> _ A, ........
34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall, on a corporationwide basis:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their
or other employees' union activities or desires.
(b) Threatening employees with reprisals because
of their union activities or protected concerted activi-
ties.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post in conspicuous places in each of Respon-
dent's plants, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted, for a period of 60
consecutive days, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice,3 on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
10, shall be signed on behalf of Respondent by its
president and the chairman of its board of directors
and, in addition, by each of the other members of the
board of directors and by the highest managerial of-
ficial of the plant in which the notice is posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Reproduce and mail to the home of each of its
employees at all of its plants a facsimile of the afore-
said signed notice, together with the letter appended
hereto as "Appendix B." Said letter shall be repro-
duced on the Company's regular business stationery
and signed by the highest official of the recipient's
plant. Also include in appropriate company publica-
tions, such as employee newsletters, a copy of the
notice, together with Appendix B. Respondent shall
provide the Regional Director for Region 10 with
proof of such mailing and publication.
(c) Reproduce and give to each supervisor at its
Tifton, Georgia, facilities a facsimile of the aforesaid
signed notice and give written instructions, signed by
the highest official at the plant, to each supervisor to
comply with the provisions of the notice. Respondent
shall provide the Regional Director for Region 10
with proof of its compliance with this paragraph.
(d) At such reasonable time after the entry of this
Order as the Board may request, convene during
working time by departments and shifts all its em-
ployees in each of its plants and, at its option, either
have the notice read by the highest managerial offi-
cial in the plant or provide facilities and permit a
In the event that this Order is enforced by ajudgment of a United States
Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
Board agent to read the notice to the said employees.
In the event Respondent chooses to have the notice
read by its official, the Board shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to provide for the attendance
of a Board agent.
(e) Upon request of the Union, made within 2
years from the date hereof, immediately grant the
Union and its representatives reasonable access to
the plant bulletin boards and all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted, at each of Re-
spondent's plants, for a period of I year from the
date of request.
(f) In the event that during a period of 2 years
following entry of this Order, any supervisor or agent
of Respondent convenes any group of employees at
any of Respondent's plants and addresses them on
the question of union representation, give the Union
reasonable notice thereof and afford two union rep-
resentatives a reasonable opportunity to be present at
such speech and, upon request of said representa-
tives, permit one of them to address the employees
for the same amount of time as Respondent's ad-
dress.
(g) If, within the next 2 years, the Board schedules
an election in which the Union participates at any of
Respondent's plants, then, upon request by the
Union, afford at least two union representatives rea-
sonable access to each of Respondent's said plants
and appropriate facilities to deliver a 30-minute
speech to employees on working time, the date
thereof to be within 10 working days before but not
within 48 hours prior to any such election.
(h) Upon request of the Union, immediately fur-
nish it with lists of the names, addresses, and classifi-
cations of all of Respondent's employees at each of
its plants as of the latest available payroll date and
furnish a corrected, current list to the Union at the
end of each 6 months thereafter during the 2-year
period referred to above.
(i) For the 2-year period, upon request of the
Union, without delay. permit a reasonable number of
union representatives access for reasonable periods
of time to all of its canteens and rest and other non-
work areas, including parking lots, within each of its
plants, for the purpose of communicating orally and
in writing with the employees in such areas during
changes of shift, breaks. mealtimes, or other non-
work periods. Respondent shall formulate rules on
this subject in the same manner as provided in J. P.
Stevens & Co., Inc., 239 NLRB No. 95 (1978).
(j) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
II IS FURIItER ORDERFI) that the allegations of un-
J. P. STEVENS &r COM PANY 35
lawful conduct not specifically found to be violative
herein shall be dismissed.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAl. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity
to give evidence, the National Labor Relations
Board has again found that we violated the National
Labor Relations Act. We intend to abide by the fol-
lowing:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization.
To form, join, or help unions.
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing.
To act together for purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
To refrain from any or all these things.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees about their or other employees' union
activities or desires.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with repri-
sals because of their union activities or protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights under the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL send to all our employees copies of
this notice, with an explanatory letter; WE WILL
give all our supervisors at Tifton, Georgia, cop-
ies of this notice and instruct them to comply
with its provisions. we WiL.L read this notice to
all our employees; and WE WILLt. grant the Union,
as ordered, access to our bulletin boards, access
to our nonwork areas, speaking opportunities,
and lists of names and addresses of our employ-
ees at many of our plants.
J. P. STEVENS & Co.. INC.
APPENDIX B
Dear Stevens Employee:
This letter, and the enclosed notice, is being sent to
all J. P. Stevens employees to inform you of a recent
decision by the National Labor Relations Board * re-
lating to the Stevens facilities in Titon, Georgia.
If the Board's Order is enforced by a court of appeals, insert at this
point, "approved by a United States Court of Appeals
The Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union, AFL CIO, has been trying to organize the
Tifton hourly employees for the purpose of having
them select that Union as their collective-bargaining
representative. After a hearing the National Labor
Relations Board found that the Company interfered
with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exer-
cise of their rights under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
As you can see from the enclosed notice, the Com-
pany has promised that, in the future, we will comply
in good faith with the labor laws.
SINCERELY YOURS
(PLANT MANAGER,
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B STONE. Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, was tried pursuant to due notice on
September 14 and 15, 1977, at Tifton, Georgia.
The charge was filed on October 26, 1976. The amended
complaint in this matter was issued on May 25, 1977. The
issues concern () whether Josephine Brooks is a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and (2)
whether Respondent, by certain supervisors, engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (a) crea-
tion of the impression of surveillance of employee union
activities, (b) promise of benefits, (c) threats of reprisals,
and (d) interrogation of employees about their or other
employees' union activities.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding. Briefs have been filed by the General
Counsel, the Charging Party, and Respondent and have
been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa-
tion of witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The facts herein are based upon the pleadings and ad-
missions therein.
J. P. Stevens & Company, Inc., Respondent, is, and has
been at all times material herein, a Delaware corporation,
with an office and place of business located at Tifton,
Georgia, where it is engaged in the manufacture of cloth
products.
Respondent, during a representative I-year period, sold
and shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located outside the State of Georgia.
As conceded by Respondent and based upon the fore-
going, it is concluded and found that the Respondent is,
and has been at all times material herein, an employer en-
lawful conduct not specifically found to be violative
J. P. STEVENS & COMPANY
A.... mu, ..
36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
I. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-
CIO, is and has been at all times material herein, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Supervisory Status
1. The status of Dale Stevenson is not disputed. Upon
consideration of the original complaint and answer, the
amended complaint and answer, and the credited testi-
mony of witnesses, it is concluded and found that Dale
Stevenson occupied the position of shift foreman for Re-
spondent and is and was a supervisor within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act.
2. The status of Arlie Blevins is not disputed. Upon con-
sideration of the pleadings and admissions therein and the
credited testimony of witnesses, it is concluded and found
that Arlie Blevins is an overseer and is and was a supervis-
or within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
3. The status of Josephine Brooks is disputed. The Gen-
eral Counsel alleges and contends that Brooks is a super-
visor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Re-
spondent contends that Brooks does not possess the
authority of a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act.
Josephine Brooks is employed as a section leader in Re-
spondent's mending department. The overall supervisor of
such department is Arlie Blevins. Said department has ap-
proximately 110 employees and has 3 section leaders.
Brooks' section has approximately 30 employees. Employ-
ees in the mending department are classified as menders,
regraders, and cloth suppliers. Brooks has been a section
leader for approximately 13-14 years. Section leaders re-
ceive a higher rate of pay than other employees. Thus, sec-
tion leaders receive $4.28 per hour, compared with $3.90
per hour for regraders and $3.66 per hour for menders.
Brooks' duties include supplying the needs of menders,
looking for defects to determine what needs to be done and
how to repair, and deciding whether to repair items.
Brooks mends only on rare occasions. Brooks keeps time
records on employees in her section, passes out paychecks
to employees in her section, and has a desk in Blevins'
office and a key to said office. Some critical styles of cloth
are inspected by regarders. If defects are noticed, usually
the section leader decides whether the material passes and
proceeds to finishing or is returned to the mender for re-
pairing, but not on production time. Section leaders must
initial certain tickets for employees to receive incentive
pay. Section leaders also can "no-credit" work, resulting in
employees being paid in accordance with time as opposed
to "production." In the absence of Supervisor Blevins, sec-
tion leaders oversee their sections in the department.
Brooks exercises authority in a limited way as regards
The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
granting time off to employees. Brooks testified to the ef-
fect that she had been granted authority to grant time off
on a limited basis when an employee had a doctor's or
dental appointment. Testimony of employee Henderson,
however, revealed that Brooks granted her a day off on two
occasions for personal reasons. Most persuasive was em-
ployee Joe Louis Robinson, a witness for Respondent, who
testified that Brooks had authority on minor matters to
grant time off and that she had been granted time off by
Brooks to go to the bank or to attend to personal business.
Considering all of the foregoing, I am persuaded that the
facts reveal that Brooks has authority to responsibly direct
work of employees in her section, that Brooks exercises
judgment in an independent manner affecting employee
earnings, and that Brooks exercises independent judgment
in granting employees time off for a day or less involving
personal business. Such authority and conduct reveal that
Brooks is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11)
of the Act. It is so concluded and found.
B. The Events of May 10, 1976 2
On May 10, 1976, Supervisor Stevenson spoke to Burks
in the back of the plant. Stevenson asked Burks if he had
signed a union card. Burks told Stevenson that he had
signed a union card. Stevenson asked Burks why he had
signed a union card. Burks told Stevenson that he had
signed a union card because he wanted better benefits and
more days off for vacation. Stevenson told Burks that he
had done a fool thing, that he could take 2 weeks' vacation
if he put in for it ahead of time.
Respondent's vacation pay policy is as follows: An em-
ployee who has been employed for I year as of June 15 of
the current year is entitled to 2 percent of said employee's
gross earnings and I week's time off. An employee who has
been employed for 5 years as of June 15 of the current year
is entitled to 4 percent of said employee's gross earnings
and 2 weeks' time off. An employee who has been em-
ployed for 15 years as of June 15 of the current year is
entitled to 6 percent of said employee's gross earnings and
3 weeks' time off. The above policy was in effect at the
time of Stevenson's statements to Burks on May 10, 1976.
Burks was employed initially sometime apparently short-
ly after July 1, 1971. Burks, in accordance with Respon-
dent's vacation pay policy, had been receiving I week's
time off and 2 percent of his gross earnings for vacation
pay.3 Since Burks would not have completed 5 years of
employment by June 15, 1976, Burks would not have been
entitled to 4 percent of his gross earnings or 2 weeks' time
off as regards the 1976 vacation pay plan. Rather, Burks
would have been entitled to receive 2 percent and I week's
time off around July 1976 and would have been entitled as
of June 15, 1977, to the 4 percent of his gross earnings and
The two witnesses to the events of May 10, 1976, were employee Burks
and Supervisor Stevenson. Burks testified to interrogation by Stevenson.
Stevenson's testimony was not in denial that such interrogation occurred
but was of the "I don't recall" type of answer. Burks testified to a conversa-
tion about vacation time. Stevenson's testimony was in denial that he prom-
ised Burks vacation time if he rejected the Union. I credit Burk's testimony
over Stevenson's as to the events in question
3 The 2 percent of gross earnings appears to be substantially equivalent to
an average week's pay.
J. P. STEVENS &r COMPANY 37
2 weeks' time off. Burks testified to the effect that the con-
versation with Stevenson on May 10, 1976, was the first
conversation wherein he had been told that he could have
2 weeks off.
Considering the foregoing, I am persuaded and conclude
and find, as alleged, that Respondent, by Stevenson, un-
lawfully interrogated Burks about his union activity on
May 10, 1976. There is no evidence of legitimate need for
such interrogation. Nor is there evidence that assurances of
nonreprisal were given to Burks by Stevenson. Under such
circumstances, the interrogation of Burks as to his union
activity was coercive in nature and therefore violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is so concluded and found.
Considering the foregoing, I am persuaded and conclude
and find that the statements of Stevenson to Burks did not
constitute, as alleged, unlawful promise of benefits to em-
ployees if the employees rejected the Union. First, there is
no evidence that Stevenson spoke to Burks concerning va-
cation pay or time off based upon the question of rejection
of the Union. Further, it is clear that Respondent had a
vacation plan in existence and that Burks was receiving a
I-week vacation in accordance with the plan. Although
Burks testified to the effect that this was the first time he
had been told that he could take a 2-week vacation if he
put in for it, I find it hard to believe that an employee of
approximately 5 years' duration would not be aware of the
general outline of the vacation pay plan and aware that
after 5 years as of June 15 of the year that he would be
entitled to a 2-week vacation. I am persuaded that under
such circumstances the remarks suggest that Stevenson
may have been confused as to exactly when Burks had
been initially employed and that Stevenson's remarks were
intended merely as argument relating to the existing plan
as opposed to Burks' reasons for wanting a union. Further,
I am persuaded that Burks would reasonably recognize
Stevenson's statements as arguments and not as promise of
benefits dependent upon rejection of the Union. Accord-
ingly, the allegation of unlawful conduct in such regard is
recommended to be dismissed.
C. Events of June 21, 1976 4
On June 21, 1976, Supervisor Brooks approached em-
ployee Henderson at her machine and asked Henderson if
she had attended a union meeting at the Ramada Inn.
Henderson told Brooks that she did not know that she had
been supposed to go to the meeting. At this time someone
called Brooks and Brooks left Henderson.
On June 21, 1976, Supervisor Brooks approached em-
ployee Byrd at her table while Byrd was talking to several
fellow employees. What occurred is revealed by the follow-
ing credited excerpts from Byrd's testimony.
Well, we was there talking and Jo, she come up, and
we was talking about the union and she asked us if
we'd signed a union card, but Mary Ann and I, we
had; Beverly, she hadn't. And she asked did we know
4 The facts are based upon the credited testimony of Henerson and Byrd.
I found Henderson and Byrd both more frank-forthright- and truthful-ap-
pearing witnesses than was Brooks. I credit their testimony over Brooks's
where in conflict.
anybody who had signed a union card and we told her
no. So she asked us did we go to the meeting down at
the Ramada Inn. So she asked us did we see any cars
down there and we told her no, but Beverly had seen
Billy Kimbrough's truck, and she told her.
And she said all the things that J. P. Stevens had
done for Billy Kimbrough while he was pushing the
union and she was needed on the perch, so she left.
Well, she said that we had it good then, but if the
union come in things like we could come in and, like,
if we had to leave or something, we could leave; but if
the union come, we couldn't do it.
Well, she said that Beverly was working eight hours
more or less like we wanted to but the union would-
well if the union come in we would have breaks and
things now, that we would just have our breaks and we
would have to give the union them eight hours.
She said with the hours, like, now we worked eight
hours and we have breaks and maybe sometimes you
don't go right back after the break is over; but she said
if the union was in, that soon as that break over you'll
have to be right back at work.
Considering the foregoing, I am persuaded and conclude
and find, as alleged, that Respondent, by Brooks, engaged
in unlawful interrogation of employees about their and
other employees' union activities. There is no evidence of
legitimate need for such interrogation. Nor is there evi-
dence that assurances of nonreprisals were given to the
employees. Under such circumstances, such interrogation
as to union matters was coercive in nature and violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is so concluded and found.
Considering the foregoing, I am persuaded, and con-
clude and find, that the Respondent, by Brooks, as alleged.
threatened employees with reprisals, tougher work condi-
tions, if the Union were selected. Such conduct is violative
of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. It is so concluded and found.
D. Events of August 1976 5
On a day in August 1976, employee Sue Domingue was
at her machine talking to an employee named Opal Weeks
about the Union. Weeks and Domingue had talked about
the Union in the past, and Weeks had expressed the opin-
ion that the plant would be closed if the Union came in.
On this occasion in August 1976, Weeks expressed such
opinion to Domingue. While Weeks and Domingue were
talking, Supervisor Blevins walked up and asked them
what they were talking about. Weeks and Domingue told
Supervisor Blevins that they were talking about the Union.
Domingue asked Supervisor Blevins what would happen if
the Union came in. However, Weeks stated in effect again
that the plant would shut down if the Union came in. Blev-
5The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Domingue and Blevins. Weeks was also presented as a witness
to the issues involved in the events. Weeks clearly appeared to be an unrelia-
ble witness, lacking in frankness and forthrightness. I discredit her testi-
mon)y. Domingue and Blevins both appeared to be witnesses attempting to
tell the truth. Domingue, however, appeared reluctant to speak loudly
enough to be heard. Domingue did not appear to have a reasonably precise
recollection of when the event occurred. In sum, I find Blevins to appear a
more reliable witness as to the events in August 1976 and credit his testi-
mony over Domingue's where in conflict.
I.~ ~ P. S T E E N . C O M P A N Y.._ _E
38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ins made no comment and turned and walked away.
Considering the foregoing, I am persuaded and conclude
and find that the facts do not establish, as alleged, that
Respondent, by Blevins, on August 15, 1976, threatened its
employees that it would close the plant if the Union were
successful in its organizational campaign. The General
Counsel contends mainly that Supervisor Blevins specifi-
cally made a statement constituting a threat as alleged.
Witness Domingue testified in effect to such a specific
statement by Blevins. I have credited Blevins' testimony to
the effect that he did not make such statement and have
discredited Domingue's testimony to such effect. The Gen-
eral Counsel, however, further contends, if the facts are as
found herein, that Respondent, by Blevins, in effect adopt-
ed such statements of a threatening nature made by Weeks
by virtue of Blevins' silence at the time. The General Coun-
sel argues that the facts and findings thereupon in Rich-
lands Textile, Inc., 220 NLRB 615, 619 (1975), support a
finding of violative conduct by the silence of Supervisor
Blevins in the face of Weeks' statement. I reject such con-
tention. Generally speaking, a respondent is not responsi-
ble for statements made by a third party who is not an
agent. The Richlands case findings and conclusions of law
represent in effect an exception to the general rule. In the
Richlands case the respondent was held liable for the fail-
ure to repudiate letters written by a prominent citizen
which were distributed in such a manner as to indicate that
the letters were authoritative. In the instant case there is no
evidence to reveal that Weeks was a person who employees
should believe had inside or authoritative information or
conveyed such information as to so indicate. No duty arose
under such circumstances for Blevins to disavow such
statements. Blevins' silence and walking away from the
conversation more realistically reveal that he was not get-
ting involved in the employee discussion about the Union.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the allegations of un-
lawful conduct in such regard be dismissed.
E. Alleged Events of August 28, 1976
Taylor testified to the effect that on August 28, 1976, he
had a conversation with Supervisor Stevenson wherein Ste-
venson referred to three employees nearby who were talk-
ing and said that he did not know what they were talking
about, but if it were about the Union and the Union came
in, that they would be sorry. Taylor testified to the effect
that Stevenson asked him how he thought the Union was
doing and that he (Taylor) responded that he didn't know.
Taylor also testified that Stevenson stated that he knew
which seven people from A shift went to the first union
meeting. Stevenson denied making such statements.
Cross-examination of Taylor as to how he recalled that
the events occurred on August 28, 1976, revealed, in my
opinion, that Taylor had no independent recollection of
the date of August 28, 1976, but relied on the fact that such
date was used in a pretrial statement. Thus, when ques-
tioned, Taylor repeated the date of August 28, 1976, as the
date of the event but gave no reason for the recollection of
such date. Taylor, however, placed the day of the week of
the event as being Thursday. It is noted that August 28,
1976, occurred on a Saturday. Part of Taylor's confusion as
regards his pretrial statement and statement to the Board
appears to flow from the fact that a pretrial statement was
taken from Taylor close to the time of the alleged events
and that at a much later date this statement became his
Board pretrial affidavit when submitted to the Board and
sworn to before an Board agent. Taylor later received a
copy of such statement back from the General Counsel
when he received his trial subpena. In such statement were
statements by Taylor pertaining to remarks allegedly by
Stevenson as to employees paid by the Union. At the trial
Taylor had no recollection of such remarks by Stevenson.
In many respects Taylor appeared a confused witness. I am
not persuaded that his testimony is reliable, and I find that
Stevenson's testimony in denial of the events appear more
reliable. I credit Stevenson's testimony in denial over
Taylor's testimony as to the alleged events.6
Considering the foregoing, I am persuaded and conclude
and find that the evidence does not establish that Supervis-
or Stevenson engaged in unlawful interrogation as to union
activities as regards Taylor on August 28, 1976, and does
not establish that Stevenson threatened employees through
Taylor with threats of reprisals on August 21 or 28, 1976.
Accordingly, allegations of unlawful conduct in such re-
gard will be recommended to be dismissed.
F. Events of September 13, 1977 7
On September 13, 1977, the day before the trial in this
matter, Supervisor Blevins attended a meeting with compa-
ny lawyers. After such meeting Blevins walked by
Domingue's work station. At such time Overseer Blevins
asked Domingue how she was doing. Domingue told Blev-
ins that she was tired. Blevins told Domingue that he was
tired, that there was no sense to all the mess that had been
going around there that day, and that he had wanted to go
to a funeral and should have gone but had not been able to
go. Domingue asked Blevins why he hadn't been able to go
to the funeral. Blevins told Domingue that he had been
with the lawyers all evening and that someone had said
that he had said that the plant would shut down if the
Union were voted in. Domingue told Blevins that he
should not worry about it, that it would blow over one day.
Considering the foregoing, I conclude and find that the
evidence is insufficient to establish, as alleged, that Re-
spondent, by Blevins, threatened an employee with reprisal
if she testified in a National Labor Relations Board pro-
ceeding. Accordingly, allegations of unlawful conduct in
such regard will be recommended to be dismissed.
the complaint alleges unlawful interrogation as to union activity by
Stevenson as occurring on August 28. 1976. The complaint also alleges that
Stevenson. on August 21. 1976, threatened an emplo)yee with reprisals. It is
clear that Taylor's testimony was presented as to these two issues hut as
occurring on August 28. 1976.
The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Domingue and Blevins. Considering Domingue's initial direct
testimony and the failure to include reference therein to remarks by Blevins
as to "not forgetting." I discredit Domingue's testimony to the effect that
Bleins stated at the end of the conversation that "he wasn't going to for-
get." I credit Blevins' denial that he made such statement. I am persuaded.
considering the logical consistency of the evidence, that Domingue did state
in effect to Blevins that the matter would "blo' over." I discredit the testi-
mon of Domingue and Blesins inconsistent with the facts found.
J. P. STEVENS & COMPANY 39
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Both the General Counsel and the Charging Party con-
tended in briefs for extraordinary remedies in this case. I
issued a notice relating to the taking of official notice of
past Board decisions relating to Respondent's history of
unfair labor practices and according Respondent the right
to present argument as to whether official notice should be
taken of certain prior cases involvin g Respondent and ar-
gument relating to possible remedy.
In accordance with such notice, I have officially noted
the decisions in J. P. Stevens and Co., Inc., cases, reported
at 157 NLRB 869 (1966); 163 NLRB 217 (1967); 167
NLRB 266; 167 NLRB 258; 171 NLRB 1202 (1968); 179
NLRB 254 (1969); 181 NLRB 666 (1970); 183 NLRB 25;
186 NLRB 180; 190 NLRB 751 (1971); 205 NLRB 1032
(1973); 217 NLRB 513 (1975): and 220 NLRB 270 (1975).9
Upon consideration of the record in this case, arguments
as to remedy, and Respondent's past history of unfair labor
practices of the type involved in this proceeding and of
other types, and for substantially the same reasons set forth
by the Board in the J. P. Stevens case reported at 220
NLRB 270, I find merit in the General Counsel's request
that an order requiring posting of the remedial notice at all
of Respondent's plants be issued.
In such case reported at 220 NLRB 270, the Board said:
i Respondent's supplemental brief received following such notice has
been considered.
i do not find it necessary to consider the history of unfair labor practices
referred to in The Black HawA Corporation cases, reported at 167 NLRB 266
(1967) and 183 NLRB 267 (1970). Were I to consider such cases, the remedy
recommended would not be affected.
In view of the extensive history of unfair labor prac-
tice violations by this Respondent and the repeated
violations of the Act which are similar to those found
in this case, we find that employees of the Respondent
at other plants must be assured of their rights under
the Act and that other employees must be assured that
they are protected against similar violations by this
Respondent. Accordingly, we find it necessary in these
circumstances to order that Respondent post the no-
tice at all of its plants.
Thus, as indicated, it will be recommended that Respon-
dent post the required remedial notice in all of its plants.
The Charging Party, in addition to corporationwide
posting of the remedial notice, requests additional reme-
dies of (I) mailing of the order, (2) access to bulletin
boards, (3) access to employee lists, (4) reading of posted
notice, (5) in-plant access to employees in nonwork areas
during nonwork time, and (6) awarding of costs. I am not
persuaded that the violations in this case reveal the neces-
sity for the remedies referred to above. Rather, I am per-
suaded that the remedies recommended are adequate to
eliminate the effect of the unfair labor practices found.0
Because of Respondent's history of unfair labor prac-
tices, I find that an order not only requiring cessation of
specific unfair labor practices but also requiring Respon-
dent not to interfere with protected rights in any other
manner is appropriate and necessary.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. J. P. Stevens & Company, Inc., Respondent, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, is, and has been at all times material herein, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices pro-
scribed by Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
to See J P. Stevens case reported at 200 NLRB 270. 271 (1975).
J. P. STEVENS & COMPANY