Johnson Publishing Co., Inc. v. Satellite Entertain-ment Communi-cations Co., Ltd.

17 Cited authorities

In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 190 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 74 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Recot, Inc. v. Becton
214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 57 times
Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Cerveceria Centroamericana v. Cerveceria
892 F.2d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1989) Cited 50 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that in the absence of evidence of intent to resume use during the period of non-use, the TTAB "may conclude the registrant has . . . failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment," even when there is evidence of intent to resume after the period of nonuse
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) Cited 58 times
Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"
In re Shell Oil Co.
992 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1993) Cited 35 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding a correlation based on evidence of “overlap of consumers”
West Florida Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Restaurants
31 F.3d 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1994) Cited 21 times
Recognizing that separate corporate, business and personal entities that operate as a single entity in the eyes of the consuming public may be treated as such for trademark purposes
In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 12 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp.
697 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 12 times
Rejecting argument that SQUIRT SQUAD in standard letters is distinct from SQUIRT registered in “distinctive lettering on a dark medallion”; “[b]y presenting its mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference cannot legally be asserted by that party”
Rule 36 - Requests for Admission
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 Cited 6,367 times 13 Legal Analyses
Noting that facts admitted pursuant to a Rule 36 discovery request are "conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended"
Section 1127 - Construction and definitions; intent of chapter
15 U.S.C. § 1127 Cited 3,033 times 99 Legal Analyses
Granting standing under § 1114 to the legal representative of the registrant of a trademark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,607 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

Johnson Publishing Co., Inc. v. Satellite Entertain-ment Communi-cations Co., Ltd.

17 Cited authorities

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Holding that in the absence of evidence of intent to resume use during the period of non-use, the TTAB "may conclude the registrant has . . . failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment," even when there is evidence of intent to resume after the period of nonuse

Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

Finding a correlation based on evidence of “overlap of consumers”

Recognizing that separate corporate, business and personal entities that operate as a single entity in the eyes of the consuming public may be treated as such for trademark purposes

Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion

Rejecting argument that SQUIRT SQUAD in standard letters is distinct from SQUIRT registered in “distinctive lettering on a dark medallion”; “[b]y presenting its mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference cannot legally be asserted by that party”

Noting that facts admitted pursuant to a Rule 36 discovery request are "conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended"

Granting standing under § 1114 to the legal representative of the registrant of a trademark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"