Joanna V.,1 Complainant, v. James N. Mattis, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency), Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 242,766 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 221,929 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,515 times 98 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) Cited 12,739 times 23 Legal Analyses
Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"
Faragher v. Boca Raton
524 U.S. 775 (1998) Cited 9,529 times 101 Legal Analyses
Holding that, to be actionable, the alleged conduct "must be extreme" and "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing" are not enough
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,433 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,285 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth
524 U.S. 742 (1998) Cited 7,260 times 93 Legal Analyses
Holding that an employer is not liable for a hostile work environment created by one of its employees when "the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise"
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden
532 U.S. 268 (2001) Cited 5,576 times 12 Legal Analyses
Holding that the temporal proximity requirement to establish a prima facie case "between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence" must be "very close"
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson
477 U.S. 57 (1986) Cited 6,626 times 18 Legal Analyses
Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive

Joanna V.,1 Complainant, v. James N. Mattis, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Intelligence Agency), Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"

Holding that, to be actionable, the alleged conduct "must be extreme" and "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing" are not enough

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that the temporal proximity requirement to establish a prima facie case "between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence" must be "very close"

Holding that sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII as discrimination on the basis of sex if it is sufficiently severe and pervasive