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J&J Technology, Inc. v. Ralph Edward Taylor

No. 91165996 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2007)
J&J Technology, Inc. v. Ralph Edward Taylor

13 Cited authorities

  1. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

  2. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 74 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

  3. Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina

    670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that admission contained in an answer was binding, despite the fact that it was made "on information and belief"

  4. In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc.

    105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that DELTA is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFÉ where the disclaimed word CAFÉ is descriptive of applicant's restaurant services

  5. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.

    315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion

  6. Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank

    811 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 13 times
    Affirming likelihood of confusion

  7. Federated Foods v. Fort Howard Paper Co.

    544 F.2d 1098 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 16 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the mere existence of modern supermarket containing wide variety or products should not foreclose further inquiry into the likelihood of confusion arising from the use of similar marks on any goods so displayed

  8. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.

    648 F.2d 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 9 times
    Finding extensive licensing of mark MONOPOLY for real estate game relevant evidence of relatedness of goods

  9. San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics Components Corp.

    565 F.2d 683 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 11 times

    Appeal No. 77-576. November 23, 1977. Rober C. Comstock, Los Angeles, Cal., of record, for appellant. Edward A. Meilman, Ostrolenk, Faber, Gerb Soffen, New York City, of record, for appellee; Sidney G. Faber, New York City, of counsel. Appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Associate Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dismissing an

  10. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,599 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

  11. Section 1057 - Certificates of registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1057   Cited 1,043 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark

  12. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

  13. Section 2.123 - Trial testimony in inter partes cases

    37 C.F.R. § 2.123   Cited 10 times

    (a) (1) The testimony of witnesses in inter partes cases may be submitted in the form of an affidavit or a declaration pursuant to § 2.20 and in conformance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, filed during the proffering party's testimony period, subject to the right of any adverse party to elect to take and bear the expense of oral cross-examination of that witness as provided under paragraph (c) of this section if such witness is within the jurisdiction of the United States, or conduct cross-examination