Jessica E.,1 Complainant, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 242,417 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 221,661 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,445 times 97 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,419 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,265 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens
460 U.S. 711 (1983) Cited 2,424 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,186 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer
Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Hlth
198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999) Cited 281 times
Finding that an employer could "regard as" disabled an employee who had lymphoma where the employer had knowledge of employee's diagnosis and a previous employee had died from the same disease
Lawson v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001) Cited 217 times
Holding that the plaintiff's diabetes and related medical conditions, which affected “many of the organ systems in his body,” were physical impairments under the ADA

Jessica E.,1 Complainant, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

13 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

Finding that an employer could "regard as" disabled an employee who had lymphoma where the employer had knowledge of employee's diagnosis and a previous employee had died from the same disease

Holding that the plaintiff's diabetes and related medical conditions, which affected “many of the organ systems in his body,” were physical impairments under the ADA