477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 223,516 times 42 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
Holding that 1–888–M–A–T–T–R–E–S–S “immediately conveys the impressions that a service relating to mattresses is available by calling the telephone number”
Holding "[e]vidence of the public's understanding of term," for purposes of establishing if mark is descriptive, "may be obtained from any competent source, including .^.^. dictionaries"
Holding that third-party evidence should not be disregarded in evaluating the strength of a mark for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion
Stating that "[a]s to strength of a mark . . . [third-party] registration evidence may not be given any weight . . . [because they are] not evidence of what happens in the market place"
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,616 times 276 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"