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In the Matter of T

9 Cited authorities

  1. Dormitory Auth. of St. of N.Y. v. Slingerland

    74 A.D.2d 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)   Cited 3 times

    Decided February 21, 1980 ORDER AFFIRMED

  2. United States v. Karnuth

    31 F. Supp. 799 (W.D.N.Y. 1940)   Cited 8 times

    No. 347. February 1, 1940. William H. Jones and Donald Bain, both of Buffalo, N.Y., for petitioner. George L. Grobe, U.S. Atty., of Buffalo, N.Y. (Joseph J. Doran, Asst. U.S. Atty., of Rochester, N.Y., of counsel), for respondent. Proceeding by the United States of America, on the relation of Adonai J.L. Chartrand, for a writ of habeas corpus directed to Arthur J. Karnuth, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Buffalo, N Y Writ dismissed. KNIGHT, District Judge. This proceeding

  3. Ponzi v. Ward

    7 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass. 1934)   Cited 9 times

    No. 5201. July 30, 1934. Peter Maggio, of Everett, Mass., for plaintiff. Francis J.W. Ford, U.S. Atty., and Arthur J.B. Cartier, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of Boston, Mass., for defendant. BREWSTER, District Judge. This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus heard upon the merits before writ issued. By agreement of parties, it was submitted upon the record in the Immigration Bureau. The petitioner is held upon a deportation warrant issued September 28, 1927. The reason for the delay in executing the

  4. The Washington

    19 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)   Cited 4 times

    May 11, 1937. J. Irving Weissman, of Brooklyn, N.Y., for relator. Lamar Hardy, U.S. Atty., of New York City (Robert L. Werner, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent. Habeas corpus proceeding by the United States on the relation of Izak Leib Schreiber, or Sofer, against Rudolph Reimer, United States Commissioner of Immigration and/or the master of the steamship Washington. Writ dismissed, and relator remanded to Commissioner's custody for deportation. LEIBELL, District Judge. The relator,

  5. Smith v. the State

    66 Tex. Crim. 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912)   Cited 8 times
    In Smith v. State, 66 Tex.Crim. 246, 146 S.W. 547, 547 (App. 1912), the defendant took the complainant's automobile without his consent and returned it on the same evening to an alley within two blocks of the complainant's house.

  6. Parr v. Loder

    97 App. Div. 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904)   Cited 11 times
    In Parr v. Loder (97 App. Div. 218, 221) it was said to be "rather a declaration than a departure in the criminal law," where it was always well settled that if a crime had been committed in the taking, or misappropriation, a subsequent restoration of the property did not constitute a defense.

  7. People v. Kenney

    135 App. Div. 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909)   Cited 5 times

    December 10, 1909. John J. Cunneen, for the appellant. Robert C. Taylor, for the respondent. INGRAHAM, J.: The defendant was indicted for grand larceny in stealing a horse and wagon and a set of harness. Upon his trial at the Court of General Sessions he was convicted of petit larceny, and from the judgment entered thereon the defendant appeals. It was proved on the trial that the defendant was in the employ of one Keefe, who was a milk dealer in the city of New York; that on the evening of the 13th

  8. Mitchell et al. v. the Territory of Oklahoma

    54 P. 782 (Okla. 1898)   Cited 11 times
    In Mitchell et al. v. Territory of Oklahoma, 7 Okla. 527, 54 P. 782, the court in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus said in part: Any taking of personal property with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner thereof, and then return the same, does not constitute larceny, but is a trespass.

  9. Payton v. the State

    34 S.W. 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896)   Cited 9 times

    No. 999. Decided March 4th, 1896. 1. Continuance — Practice. Where an application for continuance showed that process issued for the absent witnesses has not been returned, it was the duty of the defendant to present a motion in court requiring the officer to make return of said process, so that he could see what had been done. 2. Same. An application for continuance, to be sufficient, must state the facts expected to be proved by the witnesses, and not conclusions merely. And the application should