Likewise, malicious trespass, which is not a CIMT by itself, becomes one when the trespass is committed with the intent to commit larceny, which would itself be 2677 a CIMT. Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I. N. Dec. 659, 661 (B.I.A. 1979). Short is a reiteration of this general rule.
Of course, this rule makes sense, for moral turpitude is a characteristic inherent in or intrinsic to an act. See Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that to determine whether an offense is one of moral turpitude, "we consider the intrinsic or inherent nature of the crime"); Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I. N. Dec. 659, 660 (BIA 1979) ("In order to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we must look to the nature of the crime itself."). Consequently, moral turpitude cannot be created by `aggregation.
On appeal from the IJ's decision, the BIA laid out the appropriate divisibility analysis, requiring that if moral turpitude does not necessarily inhere, "it is to be treated as a "divisible' statute and thus, we look to the record of conviction, meaning indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence, to determine the offense for which the respondent was convicted." Decision of the BIA at 3 (citing Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I N Dec. (BIA 1979); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I N Dec. 269 (BIA 1975); Matter of Lopez, 13 I N Dec. 725 (BIA 1971)).
In the later case, the Board followed the same method of analysis in construing a former Florida statute defining "malicious trespass." ( Matter of E. (1979) 16 I. N. Dec. 659, 661.) Obviously, the approach to moral-turpitude analysis taken in these cases does not involve either the "readiness to do evil" test or the "least adjudicated elements" test as they have developed in California law.