Holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to deportation orders because "[d]eportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure"
Holding that where Congress fails to specify standards to guide the Attorney General's discretion in immigration, the Attorney General may rely on any reasonable factors
Explaining that special inquiry officers, the predecessors of today’s immigration judges, have "no enforcement duties" and "perform no functions other than the hearing and decision of issues in exclusion and deportation cases, and occasionally in other adjudicative proceedings"
Holding that well-founded fear of persecution was established by "a probability of deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage upon an alien for reasons of race, religion, or political opinion," and remanding denial of asylum where "[i]t became impossible for [a chef] to obtain employment in the occupation for which he was trained"
In Kasravi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968) the court held that the unavailability of employment in one's chosen occupation upon return to one's native country was insufficient to constitute extreme hardship.