BIA decisions from the 1960s invoked a different standard derived from a Third Circuit opinion, Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir.1962), that interpreted the INA's then-existing requirement (since expunged) of "physical persecution" to include "the denial of an opportunity to earn a livelihood." Id. at 746; see, e.g., Matter of Nagy, 11 I. N. Dec. 888, 890 (Nov. 30, 1966) ("[The] record does not support a claim of complete deprivation of economic opportunity within the scope of the Dunat case. . . ."); Matter of Bufalino, 11 I. N. Dec. 351, 361 (Sept. 30, 1965) (noting that "[i]t has . . . been held that economic proscription so severe as to deprive a person of all means of earning a living may amount to physical persecution" and citing Dunat); Matter of Vardjan, 10 I. N. Dec. 567, 575 (Jun. 3, 1964) (citing Dunat for the proposition that "subsistence at a low level does not meet the statutory standard for physical persecution. . . . Only total proscription of employment for such reasons suffices"). The Dunat standard reappeared in one relatively recent case, Matter of D — L — A — M — 20 I. N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1991).
As BIA Member Guendelsberger explained in his dissent in Mendoza, "the resetting of the physical presence clock upon the occurrence of particular events has been and remains inherent in the eligibility provisions for suspension of deportation." 22 I. N. Dec. at 1246 (Guendelsberger, dissenting) (citing In re Bufalino, 11 I. N. Dec. 351, 357-58 (BIA 1965) (finding that a respondent who is deportable under several grounds, one of which is listed in § 244(a)(2), is ineligible for relief under § 244(a)(1) and must establish eligibility under § 244(a)(2) from the date of the commission of the last deportable act)). That the forerunner to § 1229b was interpreted to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart supports interpreting § 1229b that way.