The BIA's analysis suffers fatally from its limited reading of "admitted" — a constraint which it has not applied in other decisions. In In re Rosas-Ramirez, for example, the BIA held that the attainment of LPR status constitutes admission, even when an alien entered without inspection. 22 I. N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1999);see also Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 1133, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting as "overly narrow" the petitioner's claim that he was never "technically" admitted to the United States because he entered without inspection). This court recently looked beyond the INA's definition of admission in Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005), and held that an LPR parent's admission can be imputed to the parent's unemancipated minor child, who resides with the parent, for the purposes of satisfying the same cancellation of removal requirement at issue in this case — seven years of continuously residing in the United States after having been "admitted in any status."

Concerning § 212(h), the IJ ruled that Martinez' underlying conviction's being an aggravated felony precluded a waiver of inadmissibility. In that regard, the IJ rejected Martinez' contention that the statutory bar for § 212(h) relief did not apply, finding In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. N. Dec. 616 (BIA 1999) (en banc), controlling. The IJ also rejected Martinez' claim to United States nationality pursuant to his voluntary registration in 1987 for military service in this country.

Reza-Murillo , 25 I. & N. Dec. at 299. For example, the BIA held in In re Rosas-Ramirez , 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 623 (BIA 1999), that adjustment to LPR status constituted an "admission" even if the adjustment was preceded by an entry that was unlawful or without inspection, in part because one who has LPR status has been "lawfully admitted for permanent residence," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). This holding avoided the "absurdity of treating aliens who entered the United States without inspection prior to being granted [LPR] status more like aliens without any valid immigration status than like permanent resident aliens who entered the United States after inspection."

and for over a decade thereafter, the BIA interpreted that phrase to include those who were accorded LPR status after their admission.See In re Rosas–Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 618–19 (B.I.A.1999) (interpreting the phrase as used in INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)); see also8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). Accordingto that interpretation, Guzman would not be eligible for § 1182(h) consideration.

"The terms `admission' and `admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A); see also In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I N Dec. 616, 620 (BIA 1999);see generally 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, AND STEPHEN YALELOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 1.03[l][b] (Matthew-Bender, Rev. Ed., through June 2010) (discussing distinction between "entry" and "admission"). Under former INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) (iii) and (B)(i), aliens were "deportable" upon commission following "entry" of two or more crimes of moral turpitude, of an aggravated felony, and of a controlled substance offense, respectively.

Before IIRIRA, deportability hinged on the concept of "entry" rather than "admission," an important distinction because it determined whether an alien faced exclusion or deportation. See Rosas-Ramirez , 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 620 (BIA 1999) (persons without an "entry" into the United States were charged as excludable, while those who had made an "entry" were deportable); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988) (former grounds for exclusion); id. § 1251(a) (1988) (former grounds for deportation). The difference mattered, because those who followed the rules and presented themselves for inspection at the border did not enjoy the substantive and procedural rights that aliens who entered illegally by evading inspection did in deportation proceedings.

The government argues that, in order to re-adjust status, Morelos would have needed an approved 212(h) waiver, which he was ineligible for at the time of his removal under the Board of Immigration Appeal's interpretation of the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I&N Dec. 616, 623 (BIA 1999). However, as the government acknowledges, we later held that "post-entry adjustment of status to [lawful permanent residence] . . . does not constitute an admission in the context of § 212(h)," making Morelos eligible for the waiver.

Id.Moreover, this court in Zhang distinguished Matter of Rosas–Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (BIA 1999), a case on which the Attorney General here relies, by explaining that, for an alien who had entered the United States illegally, as was the case in Rosas, an adjustment of status is an “admission” because an adjustment of status is the first point at which such an individual is lawfully in the United States. Zhang, 509 F.3d at 316. Thus a post-entry adjustment of status differs in its significance between individuals who had previously entered the U.S. legally, and those who had first entered the United States illegally and are only lawfully in the United Status after completing an adjustment of status.

"Thus, as long as the information was demonstrably known to an appropriate immigration official when the admission occurred, it can be relied on to sustain the charge." See id. (emphasis added); cf. Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining admission); Matter of Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. N. Dec. 616, 618-20 (BIA 1999) (same). The BIA vacated the IJ's decision because DHS officials knew of the alien's conviction at the time he was admitted, even if the particular examining officer at the border did not. See id.

In so holding, we rejected the BIA's contention that Shivaraman's "date of admission" was the date of his adjustment rather than the date of his lawful entry into the United States. We distinguished Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) and In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. N. Dec. 616 (BIA 1999), because, in those cases, the petitioners "initially entered the U.S. without inspection and authorization, and remained [in the U.S.] unlawfully until their subsequent adjustment of status. Under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), that adjustment [of status date] constituted [OcampoDuran's and Rosas-Ramirez's] first and only `admission' to this country.