In re Medina

19 Cited authorities

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council
467 U.S. 837 (1984) Cited 16,016 times 501 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"
National Cable Telecom. Assn. v. Brand X Internet S
545 U.S. 967 (2005) Cited 1,173 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that an agency is free within "the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course" only if it "adequately justifies the change"
Skidmore v. Swift Co.
323 U.S. 134 (1944) Cited 3,743 times 66 Legal Analyses
Holding that "the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator" of the statute in question, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority," were nonetheless available for guidance to the extent they had the "power to persuade"
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder
558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) Cited 187 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that Chevron deference applies to published decisions but Skidmore deference applies to unpublished decisions
Garfias–Rodriguez v. Holder
702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) Cited 133 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that petitioner could not have relied on Perez-Gonzalez because he filed his application before that case was decided
Nunez v. Holder
594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) Cited 65 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that the correct inquiry under the categorical approach is whether there is a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the [s]tate would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside" the federal definition
People v. Rehmeyer
19 Cal.App.4th 1758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) Cited 101 times
Finding substantial evidence of criminal intent based on a defendant's prior crime with the same modus operandi
Bobadilla v. Holder
679 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2012) Cited 33 times
Finding the petitioner's conviction of false identification to a police officer in violation of Minnesota state law to not be a CIMT when applying the modified categorical approach
People v. Carbajal
114 Cal.App.4th 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) Cited 41 times
Holding that visual observation of the offense is not required to support an indecent exposure conviction
People v. Massicot
97 Cal.App.4th 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) Cited 43 times
Holding that the common law targeted genital exposure, therefore, in the "absence of express definitions, . . . we may construe the statute to encompass indecent exposure as it was defined at common law"
Section 1227 - Deportable aliens
8 U.S.C. § 1227 Cited 7,882 times 40 Legal Analyses
Granting this discretion to the Attorney General

In re Medina

19 Cited authorities

Holding that courts "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"

Holding that an agency is free within "the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course" only if it "adequately justifies the change"

Holding that "the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator" of the statute in question, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority," were nonetheless available for guidance to the extent they had the "power to persuade"

Holding that Chevron deference applies to published decisions but Skidmore deference applies to unpublished decisions

Holding that petitioner could not have relied on Perez-Gonzalez because he filed his application before that case was decided

Holding that the correct inquiry under the categorical approach is whether there is a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the [s]tate would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside" the federal definition

Finding substantial evidence of criminal intent based on a defendant's prior crime with the same modus operandi

Finding the petitioner's conviction of false identification to a police officer in violation of Minnesota state law to not be a CIMT when applying the modified categorical approach

Holding that visual observation of the offense is not required to support an indecent exposure conviction

Holding that the common law targeted genital exposure, therefore, in the "absence of express definitions, . . . we may construe the statute to encompass indecent exposure as it was defined at common law"

Granting this discretion to the Attorney General