The Court emphasized that, in its interpretation, the BIA has repeatedly held that a theft offense is not a CIMT if the statute criminalizes deprivations of property that are intended to be temporary. Castillo-Cruz, No. 06-70896, slip op. at 13478 (citing Matter of Grazley, 14 I&N Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973); Matter of P, 2 I&N Dec. 887 (BIA 1947); Matter of H, 2 I&N Dec. 864, 865 (BIA 1947); Matter of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I&N Dec. 29, 33 (BIA 2006)). Relying on the BIA’s decision in Matter of Jurado-Delgado, in which the BIA held that the “inherently base, vile, or depraved” conduct that must exist for a finding of moral turpitude was evinced in the offender’s “intention to permanently deprive the owner of his property” by joyriding in a vehicle, the Ninth Circuit held: “A recipient who intends, by receiving the stolen property, to deprive its rightful owner of its possession only temporarily would not seem to have committed an act that may be termed morally turpitudinous.”