To be sure, the Board does not follow an absolute rule of stare decisis, and therefore Vasquez-Rodriguez could have urged the Board to depart from Matter of E-A-G- . See In re E-L-H- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 814, 823 (B.I.A. 2005) (en banc) (explaining that "published Board decisions remain binding" until they are "modified by the Board"); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(1). In support of his argument, he could have cited cases from other circuits criticizing the Board's analysis in Matter of E-A-G- .
See 443 F.3d at 1081. This referral was "an unusual move," id. at 1075, preventing judicial review of the BIA's decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7), (h)(1)(ii); Ren v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006); In re E-L-H-, 23 I. N. Dec. 814, 820 (BIA 2005). It is not clear that the Attorney General ever accepted Nadarajah's case; at the very least, there was no "established timeline" for decision. Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1075.
1(h)(1)(i); In re N____ J____ B____, 22 I. N. Dec. 1057, 1088 (AG 1997), thereby rendering the Board's decision nonfinal and hence not judicially reviewable. In re E____ L____ H____, 23 I. N. Dec. 814, 820 (BIA 2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). That would be a step beyond the one the Attorney General has taken in this case in asking us to remand the case.
When conducting a credible fear or reasonable fear interview, an asylum officer must determine what law applies to the applicant's claim. The asylum officer should apply all applicable precedents of the Attorney General and the BIA, Matter of E-L-H- , 23 I & N Dec. 814, 819 (BIA 2005), which are binding on all immigration judges and asylum officers nationwide. The asylum officer should also apply the case law of the relevant federal circuit court, to the extent that those cases are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B- .