We have already covered both of these decisions in great detail on this site, and I encourage you read our full articles for detailed analysis. In this section, I will address the decisions in brief while providing commentary on a passage Judge Gorsuch wrote about De Niz Robles in the law article he wrote after the death of Justice Scalia.Both cases addressed whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) could apply its precedent decision in the Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) [PDF version], retroactively to a case in which the Tenth Circuit had reached a different conclusion prior to the BIA decision.A key issue in both of these cases is that of Chevron deference. Under the Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 847 (1984) [PDF version], courts are generally required to defer to an administrative agency's reading of a statute where the statute is ambiguous and the agency's reading of the statute is reasonable.

In this article, we will examine Judge Gorsuch's position on Chevron deference through his writings in Gutierrez-Brizuela and in other cases.OVERVIEW OF GUTIERREZ-BRIZUELA AND DE NIZ ROBLESGutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016) [PDF version] was a case concerning immigration law. Specifically, it addressed whether the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA's) decision in the Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) [PDF version] — which restricted eligibility for section 245(i) adjustment of status [see article] — could be applied retroactively. The Tenth Circuit had previously found that Briones did not apply retroactively in De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015) [PDF version].

This steadfast dedication has resulted in thousands of immigrants throughout the United States.___________________Legal Opinion, Martin, General Counsel, INS, CO 245(i), CO 212(a)(6)(A) (Feb. 19, 1997), reprinted in 74 No. 11 Interpreter Releases 499, 516-22 (Mar. 24, 1997)Matter of Diaz, 25 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 2010); Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007); Matter of Torres-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 866 (BIA 2006)But see Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771, 779 n.6 (BIA 2012) [departure and return under grand of advance parole will not harm eligibility for LIFE Act AOS)INA § 245(d); 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.1(c), 1245.

During the prolonged delay, the law changed underneath Mr. De Niz Robles’ feet. In 2007, the BIA issued Matter of Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2007), finding the permanent bar to be the dominant statute. And in 2011, the Tenth Circuit adopted the agency rationale as its own, holding in Padilla-Caldera v. Holder (Padilla-Caldera II), 637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011), that the permanent bar trumped § 245(i).With the change in law from Padilla I to II, Mr. De Niz Robles’ green card application was denied and he was ordered removed from the country.