IHC Health Services, Inc. and Inter-mountain Health Care, Inc. v. Gupta Institute for Pain Wellness & Rehabilitation

37 Cited authorities

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 217,274 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik v. Murata Mach
731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984) Cited 276 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that mere allegations do not create a material issue of fact if the nonmovant cannot "point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counter statement of a fact or facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant."
Sweats Fashions v. Pannill Knitting Co.
833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 163 times
Finding that, on review of a grant of summary judgment in a USPTO opposition proceeding, "[opposer] would have us infer bad faith because of [registrant's] awareness of [opposer's] marks. However, an inference of 'bad faith' requires something more than mere knowledge of a prior similar mark. That is all the record here shows."
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 188 times 30 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) Cited 72 times 4 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 72 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice
710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 86 times
Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them
Metrop. Life v. Bancorp
527 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) Cited 37 times
Holding that district court erred in denying plaintiff's Rule 56 motion for discovery and should not have treated the defendant's witnesses' declarations as truthful but "should have allowed Bancorp a reasonable opportunity for discovery concerning the accused components of the Vantage system"
Herbko Intern., Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.
308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002) Cited 45 times
Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc.
912 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990) Cited 67 times
Holding that district court erred by "basing its decision on a single laches period for all three patents" when they were all issued at different times
Rule 56 - Summary Judgment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Cited 330,364 times 158 Legal Analyses
Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,585 times 272 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1057 - Certificates of registration
15 U.S.C. § 1057 Cited 1,027 times 5 Legal Analyses
Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 23 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

IHC Health Services, Inc. and Inter-mountain Health Care, Inc. v. Gupta Institute for Pain Wellness & Rehabilitation

37 Cited authorities

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that mere allegations do not create a material issue of fact if the nonmovant cannot "point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counter statement of a fact or facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant."

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that the shared term GIANT is the dominant portion of the marks, which supports a finding that there would be a likelihood of confusion between them

Holding that district court erred in denying plaintiff's Rule 56 motion for discovery and should not have treated the defendant's witnesses' declarations as truthful but "should have allowed Bancorp a reasonable opportunity for discovery concerning the accused components of the Vantage system"

Explaining that proprietary rights are necessary to show priority of use when petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)

Holding that district court erred by "basing its decision on a single laches period for all three patents" when they were all issued at different times

Holding a party may move for summary judgment on any part of any claim or defense in the lawsuit

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"