IEH Auto Parts LLC v. SSP Otomotiv Sanayi Ve Dis Tic. A.S.

35 Cited authorities

Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf
78 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1996) Cited 216 times
Holding that expansion was relevant because it could lead to further actual confusion
Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 109 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark
In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 194 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 76 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
Recot, Inc. v. Becton
214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) Cited 57 times
Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
Ritchie v. Simpson
170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Cited 48 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) Cited 26 times
Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services
In re Nat. Data Corp.
753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 74 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group
637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) Cited 27 times 3 Legal Analyses
Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"
Rule 408 - Compromise Offers and Negotiations
Fed. R. Evid. 408 Cited 4,501 times 50 Legal Analyses
Holding that premature deliberations constituted an internal jury influence subject to the post-verdict restrictions of Rule 606(b)
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,616 times 275 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1141f - Effect of filing a request for extension of protection of an international registration to the United States
15 U.S.C. § 1141f Cited 8 times 3 Legal Analyses
Requiring a declaration of "bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce"
Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence
37 C.F.R. § 2.122 Cited 24 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"

IEH Auto Parts LLC v. SSP Otomotiv Sanayi Ve Dis Tic. A.S.

35 Cited authorities

Holding that expansion was relevant because it could lead to further actual confusion

Holding that it is the opposer's burden to prove fame of its mark

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"

Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration

Finding “real interest” is shown by “a direct and personal stake in the outcome” or a “legitimate personal interest.”

Affirming TTAB's finding that the mark STONE LION CAPITAL was similar to the marks LION CAPITAL and LION, finding that little weight should be accorded to the addition of "Stone" because it did not distinguish the marks in the context of the parties' services

Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Considering "corporate studies tracking awareness of the CITIBANK mark"

Holding that premature deliberations constituted an internal jury influence subject to the post-verdict restrictions of Rule 606(b)

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Requiring a declaration of "bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce"

Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"