IBEW, AFL-CIO

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 20, 1972

194 N.L.R.B. 1225 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

IBEW, AFL-CIO
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO and Waters Manufacturing, Inc. Case
1-CB-1839
January 20, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
KENNEDY
On December 6, 1971, Trial Examiner Frederick U.
Reel issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
FREDERICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner: This case, heard at
Boston, Massachusetts, on October 18, 1971,1 pursuant to a
charge filed July 2 and a complaint issued August 23,
presents the question whether Respondent, herein called
the Union, violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act by
allegedly utilizing a supervisory employee of the Charging
Party, herein called the Company, as an agent for the
solicitation of union authorization cards.
Upon the entire record2 and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by General Counsel and by the Union I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Company, a Massachusetts corporation engaged at
Wayland in manufacturing precision resistors , annually
ships finished products valued in excess of $50,000 to points
directly outside the State, and is therefore an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1 All dates herein refer to the year 1971
2 I hereby direct that the transcript of testimony be corrected at page 31
11. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1225
In June 1971 the Union started organizing the Company's
employees. Richard Rogers, an International representa-
tive of the Union, gave authorization cards to a number of
company employees, which they in turn were to distribute
to other employees. One employee to whom Rogers gave a
number of cards was a Mr. King. In the course of giving
cards to King and three other employees, Rogers "told
them clearly that supervisors could not sign." Some days
later King was discussing the Union with a fellow employee
when a company supervisory employee, Robert Rullie,
passed by .3 Rullie, overhearing the conversation, volun-
teered to sign a card. He also asked King for a few more
cards which, Rullie said, he would try to have signed. King
gave some cards to Rullie, who signed one himself and
obtained signatures on about 10 other cards, all of which he
turned back to King. In soliciting signatures Rullie
confined himself to statements of fact as to how many the
Union needed to get an election, and to win an election.
King did not tell Rullie what to say when Rullie passed out
the cards. Rulhe never had any conversation with, and had
never seen, Union Representative Rogers.
B. Discussion
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Rullie was
an agent of the Union, I would have some difficulty in
finding a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) on the foregoing
facts. The cards he obtained are probably of no value in
determining whether the Union has sufficient support to
obtain a Board election, and as a supervisor his conduct
may be attributable to his employer and involve the latter
in violation of Section 8(a)(2), and, derivatively, Section
8(a)(1). But to find a union guilty of restraint or coercion of
employees merely because it used a supervisor to solicit
cards goes beyond any precedent of which I am aware, and
gives extraordinary scope to Section 8(b)(1)(A). Cf.
N.L.R.B. v. Drivers, etc. Local 639 (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S.
274, 285-291. If the employer, who filed the charge in this
case, wishes to control or prevent his supervisors from
distributing union cards, he would seem to have authority
to do so; their conduct in so doing would not appear to
enjoy the protection of Section 7, as they are not employees
under Section 2(3).
But we do not even reach these problems in this case, for
I can perceive no basis whatsoever for finding that Rullie
was an agent of the Union. Rogers was such an agent, and
he conferred certain authority on King, but there is nothing
to show that he gave King any authority to make anyone
else, let alone a supervisor, a union agent. Indeed, by telling
King that supervisors could not sign cards, Rogers appears
to have expressly withheld from King any authority to deal
with supervisors. King therefore acted in excess of his
authority in permitting Rullie to solicit for the Union, and
the Union is not bound by Rulhe's acts. The fact that the
Union accepted the cards from King is not a ratification of
to reflect that the Respondent rested without adducing evidence.
3 Rullie did not supervise King
194 NLRB No. 200
1226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
his action, as the Union had no way of knowing that Rullie RECOMMENDED ORDER
solicited any cards.4
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Union has not engaged in the unfair labor practice
alleged in the complaint.
4 In Pangles Master Markets, Inc, 190 NLRB No. 58, the Board held
that a umon did not violate Section 8(bXl)(A) when it used meat
department managers to solicit for the umon , reasoning that the managers
were "minor supervisors customarily within the unit," although in that case
they were "supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act " Although
General Counsel seeks to distinguish Pangles as dealing only with "minor
supervisors," I find it additional authority for the result I have reached. In
Pangles the union directly asked the managers to solicit; here there was no
The complaint should be, and hereby is, dismissed.
pnvity between the Union and Rulhe Also , there is no showing here that
Rullie was somehow more of a "supervisor" than the managers in Pangles
who had authority to hire, fire , and discipline employees, and to schedule
working hours-powers Rullie apparently did not possess. If General
Counsel, who has the burden of proof, could carry it by showing that Rullie
was "more" of a supervisor than Pangles ' managers, he has certainly failed
to do so here.