Hartz Hotel Services, Inc.

10 Cited authorities

In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) Cited 191 times 33 Legal Analyses
Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
In re Viterra Inc.
671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) Cited 26 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"
In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
315 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Cited 13 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion
Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.
951 F.2d 330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Cited 14 times
Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co.
703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Cited 20 times 2 Legal Analyses
In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.
Sure-Fit Products Co. v. Saltzson Drapery
254 F.2d 158 (C.C.P.A. 1958) Cited 21 times
In Sure-Fit Products Company v. Saltzson Drapery Company, 1958, 254 F.2d 158, 45 C.C.P.A. 856, an opposition proceeding, the court in holding that "Rite-Fit" as a trademark for ready made slip covers was not confusingly similar to the prior trademark "Sure-Fit" for identical goods sold in direct competition, noted that its decision was most strongly influenced by the fact that the marks in question were the weakest possible type of mark.
Wilson v. Delaunay
245 F.2d 877 (C.C.P.A. 1957) Cited 11 times
In Wilson, the board similarly noted that, as between a company seeking to register "Newports" for women's shoes and a company selling outer shirts under the "Newport" brand, the singular form of Newport was materially indistinguishable under those circumstances.
Peerless Elec. Co. v. Peerless Elec.
206 Misc. 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954)
10-21-1954 Peerless Electric Company, a Foreign Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Peerless Electric Inc., a Domestic Corporation, Defendant. Ganville Whittlesey, Jr., George A. Birrell, Joseph S. Kelly and Henry H. Hoppe for plaintiff. Armand E. Lackenbach and Burton Perlman for defendant. STEUER, J. Plaintiff is an Ohio corporation and it or its predecessors of the same name have been in business for over fifty years. Plaintiff has an excellent reputation both for credit and for its products. Its business
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,610 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1057 - Certificates of registration
15 U.S.C. § 1057 Cited 1,053 times 5 Legal Analyses
Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark

Hartz Hotel Services, Inc.

10 Cited authorities

Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"

Holding that "any minor differences in the sound of [X–Seed and XCEED marks for agricultural seeds] may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be sufficient to distinguish the marks"

Holding that malt liquor and tequila sold under the same mark would cause a likelihood of confusion

Concluding that “substantial and undisputed differences” between the parties' use of FROOTEE ICE and FROOT LOOPS warranted summary judgment because “the dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties itself made it unlikely that confusion would result from the simultaneous use of the marks”

In University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the court added that section 2(a) embraces concepts of the right to privacy which may be violated even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.

In Wilson, the board similarly noted that, as between a company seeking to register "Newports" for women's shoes and a company selling outer shirts under the "Newport" brand, the singular form of Newport was materially indistinguishable under those circumstances.

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Providing that a certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of an owner's right to use the mark